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INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act1 and sixtieth 
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education2 merit both celebration 
for how far we have come and critical evaluation of how far we have 
left to go. Since Brown was decided in 1954, the United States has 
engaged in a vast array of reforms undertaken at least partly in the 
name of educational equality.3 Desegregation, school finance reform, 
the education of students with disabilities and English language 
learners (ELLs), the various iterations of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), standards and accountability 
based reforms, and school choice round out only the most high 
profile of these reform efforts. These reforms have spanned across 
the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. They have involved 
federal and state governments and school districts, and they 
sometimes have been undertaken with the ambitious aim of 
transforming teaching and learning at the school and classroom 
levels. 
Despite this persistent commitment to the ideal of educational 
equality, such reforms have reflected a range of ideas about the place 
of education in our broader society and, in turn, what an equal and 
high-quality education actually means.4 Large-scale education 
reform in the period immediately following Brown and the civil 
rights era was largely aimed at providing students with equal 
educational access and learning opportunities for two main purposes: 
maintaining an inclusive and robustly functioning democracy and 
facilitating social mobility.5 Since then, other goals have become 
central as well, such as supporting the international economic 
competitiveness of the United States in an increasingly globalized 
world6 and ensuring that parents have the individual freedom to 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 401-410, 78 Stat. 241, 
246-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (2012)).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See generally BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION 
LAW AND POLICY, 1954-2010 (2013).
4. See David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American 
Struggle over Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 41-43 (1997).
5. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 48-70 (Princeton Univ. 
Press rev. ed. 1999) (analyzing the political purposes of education); CARL F.
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 75-
77 (1983) (charting the relationship between education and democracy).
6. See NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A
NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) [hereinafter A
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make educational choices for their children.7 While it is important to 
keep these newer goals in mind and critically consider their place in 
the history of education reform, it is also important for us to 
understand our current efforts in relation to the conceptions of 
equality underlying Brown, the Civil Rights Act, and concurrent 
education reform efforts. Indeed, although equalizing educational 
opportunities for students has been a primary aim of education law 
and policy since at least Brown, we now risk taking an overly narrow 
view of why we educate students.
Grounded in a commitment to the goals historically underlying 
Brown and the Civil Rights Act, this Article analyzes two of the most 
important types of education reforms currently being undertaken—
states’ development of teacher evaluation and accountability systems 
and changes to states’ collective bargaining laws for teachers. 
Reformers have framed both of these changes as necessary for 
increasing and equalizing teachers’ effectiveness and ultimately 
students’ learning opportunities.8 Since the late 2000s, a wave of 
state-level laws aimed at enhancing teacher evaluation and 
accountability has emerged across the United States.9 These laws 
generally increase the frequency of teacher evaluation, specify in 
detail how teachers must be evaluated, and increase accountability 
for teachers’ performance.10 New requirements formally tying 
teacher evaluation to student performance on standardized tests and 
anchoring decisions about teacher employment and tenure in these 
evaluations constitute central elements of these laws. From 2009 to 
2012, as many as twenty-four states put in place new legislation 
requiring teacher evaluations to include student achievement data.11
NATION AT RISK], available at http://www.datacenter.spps.org/uploads/sotw_a_
nation_at_risk_1983.pdf (focusing national attention on the quality of work students 
completed and comparative deficiencies in the nation’s educational system, stating 
that “the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a 
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people”). 
7. See generally Chris Lubienski, Redefining “Public” Education: Charter 
Schools, Common Schools, and the Rhetoric of Reform, 103 TCHRS. C. REC. 634 
(2001).
8. See Liana Heitin, Chicago Strike Puts Spotlight on Teacher-Evaluation 
Reform: Conflict Reflects Broader Tensions over Use of Test Scores, EDUC. WK., 
Sept. 19, 2012, at 16, 16-17 (highlighting how teacher evaluation and collective 
bargaining reform influenced the Chicago teachers’ strike).
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. 
11. See id.; see also JULIE GREENBERG, ARTHUR MCKEE & KATE WALSH,
TEACHER PREP REVIEW: A REVIEW OF THE NATION’S TEACHER PREPARATION 
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Moreover, the push for evaluating teachers and holding them 
accountable for their performance has begun to bleed into other 
areas, such as state laws governing teacher preparation.12 Although 
states have been the primary sites for teacher evaluation and 
accountability reform, the federal government also has pushed states 
in this direction. The Race to the Top Fund (RTT), contained in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 
included financial incentives for states to implement such systems.13
Waivers releasing states from certain requirements of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) incentivized such changes as 
well.14
Given that modern teacher evaluation and accountability 
systems are generally aimed at identifying and removing poorly 
performing teachers and form the basis for alterations to teacher 
compensation policies, these reforms directly intersect with 
collective bargaining laws for teachers. A large majority of states has 
long had in place laws that allow teachers’ unions to require school 
districts to engage in collective bargaining over a range of issues, 
including teacher salaries, layoff procedures, and grievance and 
dismissal procedures.15 These laws form the foundation and 
ultimately the boundaries for the collective bargaining agreements 
that can be made between school districts and local teachers’ unions. 
As such, these laws generally frame the tenure and employment 
PROGRAMS 63 (2013), available at http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/Teacher_
Prep_Review_2013_Report.
12. See Benjamin Michael Superfine & Alison Castro Superfine, Improving 
Mathematics Teacher Preparation Policy in Illinois, in 2 UIC RESEARCH ON URBAN 
EDUCATION POLICY INITIATIVE POLICY BRIEF 1, 2 (2013), available at             
http://c-stemec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Improving-Mathematics-Teacher-
Preparation-Policy-in-Illinois.pdf (examining recent changes in teacher preparation 
policy).
13. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 14005-06, 123 Stat. 115, 282-83.
14. See Alyson Klein, Ed. Dept. to Offer Some Waiver States Time, 
Flexibility on Teacher Evaluation, EDUC. WK. (July 2, 2014), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2014/07/ed_dept_to_offer_some_
waiver_s.html; Alyson Klein, “Race to the Top” Standards Link Questioned, EDUC.
WK. (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/12/16/15standards_ep-2.h29.html?qs=
Alyson+Klein (reporting on the use of NCLB waivers to initiate education reform in 
states).
15. Benjamin A. Lindy, Note, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining 
Laws on Student Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment,
120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1133 (2011) (surveying the landscape of collective bargaining 
laws in education). 
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decisions that are implicated by recently enacted teacher evaluation 
systems. However, many of these laws recently have been weakened 
in concert with the enactment of teacher evaluation systems. For 
example, at least twelve states modified their laws governing 
collective representation of public employees in 2010 alone.16 In 
doing so, many of these states have weakened teachers’ unions’ 
abilities to bargain over issues such as teacher employment, 
grievance procedures, compensation, and working conditions.17
Together, states’ enactment of teacher evaluation and accountability 
systems and modifications of laws governing collective bargaining 
form the centerpiece of reforms aimed at equalizing and increasing 
teachers’ effectiveness.
Although these intertwined reform efforts have some promise 
for improving and equalizing students’ learning opportunities, a deep 
examination of them reveals that they are not well designed to fulfill 
the goals historically underlying Brown and the Civil Rights Act. On 
one hand, the broad aim of improving teachers’ effectiveness reflects 
an important advance over many education reforms of the past. 
Although much energy has been devoted to equalizing and 
improving students’ educational opportunities, such reform efforts 
have generally failed to achieve the significant and lasting effects at 
scale that many of the reformers driving such changes have sought.18
However, a growing consensus among education researchers 
indicates that teacher quality and effectiveness are some of the most 
important factors influencing student learning.19 Moreover, while 
16. Martin H. Malin, Sifting Through the Wreckage of the Tsunami That Hit 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 533, 533 (2012) 
(examining changes in collective bargaining law in twelve states).
17. See id. at 535, 539-44 (discussing the following states that have 
drastically narrowed the scope of collective bargaining for teachers since 2010: 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin). 
18. See generally Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2417 (2004) (discussing the limitations of judicial action in 
desegregation and school funding litigation).
19. See JENNIFER KING RICE, UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TEACHER ATTRIBUTES, at v (2003); BRIAN ROWAN, RICHARD CORRENTI & ROBERT J.
MILLER, WHAT LARGE-SCALE, SURVEY RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT TEACHER 
EFFECTS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: INSIGHTS FROM THE PROSPECTS STUDY OF 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 6, 9-10, 14, 23 (2002), available at
http://cpre.org/images/stories/cpre_pdfs/rr51.pdf. One study estimated that teacher 
quality explains 7.5% of the variation in student achievement. See Eric A. 
Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, Teachers, Schools, and Academic 
Achievement 21, 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6691, 
1998), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6691.pdf.
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teacher quality and effectiveness are especially important for 
improving the performance of poor and minority students, they are 
inequitably distributed among students.20 Exacerbating such issues, 
most traditional teacher evaluation systems have resulted in almost 
every teacher receiving a high rating.21 Recent reforms aimed at 
improving teacher effectiveness accordingly reflect an effort to 
improve, at least in part, the inequitable distribution of students’ 
learning opportunities.
On the other hand, these reforms are poorly designed to 
provide all students with the educational opportunities they need to 
engage deeply with the democratic process and facilitate their social 
mobility. The teacher evaluation and accountability reforms suffer 
from a range of problems, including technical issues with the design 
of testing systems, the likely effects of these systems on teachers’ 
motivation, and ultimately the watered-down vision of teaching and 
learning underlying these systems. Indeed, the vision underlying 
these laws of what it means to teach effectively is one closely 
aligned with industrial work, in which teaching is treated as 
mechanistic and routine. Such industrial work stands in stark contrast 
to that of a professional teacher, who can skillfully and flexibly 
engage with a variety of students to promote rigorous and analytical 
thinking. This type of thinking is precisely what is needed to support 
a highly functioning democracy and facilitate social mobility among 
students in the twenty-first century. Compounding such problems, 
the primary legal defenses available to teachers who have been 
terminated under teacher evaluation and accountability systems 
protect teachers the most when they act more like industrial workers 
than professionals.
State laws governing collective bargaining with teachers’ 
unions generally drive teaching and learning in a similar direction. 
While there are important differences among states’ collective 
20. The U.S. Department of Education found that “only 23% of all teachers, 
and only 14% of teachers in high-poverty schools, come from the top third of 
college graduates,” and 90% of high-minority districts face significant challenges 
attracting highly qualified science and mathematics teachers. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
OUR FUTURE, OUR TEACHERS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN FOR TEACHER 
EDUCATION REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT 5, 6 (2011), available at
http://www.ed.gov/sites/default/files/our-future-our-teachers.pdf.
21. For example, the New Teacher Project found in a study of ten school 
districts that 94% of teachers were rated as satisfactory. DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL.,
THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON 
DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 6, 11 (2d ed. 2009), available at 
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TheWidgetEffect_2nd_ed.pdf.
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bargaining laws for teachers, they are also fundamentally grounded 
in a vision of teaching as industrial labor.22 Under the conditions put 
in place by these laws, teachers’ unions and school districts are 
incentivized to bargain in a way that foregrounds “‘bread and butter’ 
issues” involving the protection of teachers against the decisions of 
management.23 On a broader level, such collective bargaining laws 
weaken the possibility of robust teacher input into the design of 
teacher evaluation, which is critical for a highly functioning school 
environment characterized by collaboration and professional activity. 
The net result of such reform is that the quality of teaching and 
learning, which is critical for achieving our most fundamental 
political and social goals, is being driven in the wrong direction.
In order to analyze recent developments in teacher evaluation 
and their relationship with collective bargaining, this Article is 
divided into five primary parts. In Part I, this Article surveys the 
major goals underlying Brown, the Civil Rights Act, and major 
education reforms since the civil rights era. This Part also considers 
reforms particularly aimed at the teacher workforce. In Part II, this 
Article examines recent developments in teacher evaluation and the 
legal protections teachers potentially have available to them. This 
Part focuses on the major problems these systems involve and 
highlights the form of teaching and learning such systems 
incentivize. In Part III, this Article analyzes the terrain of laws 
governing collective bargaining for teachers. This Part particularly 
covers the issues over which teachers’ unions and school districts 
can and must bargain and the potential effects on schools. In Part IV, 
this Article offers recommendations for moving forward more 
productively and in a way that is sensitive to the historical goals 
underlying Brown and the Civil Rights Act. These recommendations 
are particularly attuned to how these reforms can be structured more 
productively to provide equal and high-quality educational 
opportunities for all students. Finally, this Article offers concluding 
thoughts.
22. See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law 
Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 
(1990) (discussing the historical roots of collective bargaining law in the industrial 
labor movement).
23. Id. at 693.
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I. STUDENTS, TEACHERS, AND EDUCATION REFORM 
A. History of Large-Scale Education Reform
Large-scale education reform long has aimed at equalizing and 
increasing students’ educational opportunities. However, since the 
civil rights era, the focus of major education reform efforts has 
shifted along at least three major dimensions. First, while major 
education reform efforts were originally structured to protect the 
rights of harmed groups of students, they shifted to focus on 
reforming entire school systems built in ways that produced 
inequalities. Second, while major education reforms originally 
focused on educational inputs, such as access to predominantly white 
schools, they shifted to focus on educational outputs such as student 
performance. Third, while major education reforms originally were 
structured around sameness between different groups of students, 
they shifted to emphasizing that all students receive at least an 
adequate, or standard, level of educational opportunities and exhibit 
at least adequate performance.24 As such, the modern wave of 
education reform focuses on increasing and equalizing teacher 
quality and effectiveness to increase student performance in school 
systems as a whole.
Large-scale education law and policy during the civil rights era 
largely focused on educational inputs and access. Brown v. Board of 
Education and the desegregation litigation that immediately followed 
primarily focused on ensuring that African-American students had 
access to the same schools that white students do.25 These reforms 
were grounded in the twin goals of ensuring that the U.S. democracy 
functions well and facilitating social mobility for students.26
Although courts faced significant political resistance, especially 
during the decade of “massive resistance,” other governmental 
branches soon became involved in the fray.27 Similarly grounded in 
24. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 401-410, 78 Stat. 
241, 246-49 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (2012))
(discussing the transformation of equality in education law and policy). 
25. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of 
American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1602-03
(2003) (surveying the history of desegregation litigation).
26. See Labaree, supra note 4, at 43, 50 (discussing educational goals 
underlying civil rights era reforms).
27. During the era of “massive resistance,” the politics of Southern states 
moved far to the right as these states actively resisted the requirement to 
desegregate. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
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the goal of access, particularly in education, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 marked the beginning of involvement of the other branches. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act was especially important for 
requiring that no person can be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving federal funds on the basis of race, 
color, or national origin.28 Building on the foundation of the Civil 
Rights Act, the ESEA was aimed at addressing the inequalities in 
educational outcomes and opportunities between low-income 
students and their more affluent peers.29 The cornerstone of this 
legislation was Title I. Since its inception, Title I has granted billions 
of dollars to states, which in turn passed on that funding to school 
districts and schools, depending on the number of low-income 
students.30 Indeed, as the governmental branches worked together 
during the mid-1960s to early 1970s, desegregation efforts were at 
their most successful.31
Given the perceived success of education law and policy to 
advance a civil rights agenda, reformers continued to focus their 
efforts in a similar direction. School finance litigation, largely 
beginning in the late 1960s and 1970s, focused on equalizing funding 
for low-income students.32 In the 1970s, courts and legislatures also 
put in place formal procedures for protecting the rights of disabled 
students33 and ELLs.34 However, the slate of civil rights-style reforms 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 389-92 (2004) 
(examining Southern resistance to the requirement to desegregate).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d).
29. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 1001, 20 U.S.C. § 
6301 (2012).
30. See id. §§ 6301-6578. See generally Janet Y. Thomas & Kevin P. 
Brady, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act at 40: Equity, Accountability, 
and the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education, 29 REV. OF RES. IN EDUC. 51
(2005). 
31. Only 1.18% of African-American students in the South attended 
desegregated schools in 1964, and only 6.1% of these students attended 
desegregated schools in 1966. However, this figure increased to 16.9% in 1967, 32% 
in 1969, and 90% in 1973. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 363.
32. For a strong history of school finance reform litigation and policy, see 
generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995) (providing a detailed overview of different 
school funding schemes and litigation through the mid-1990s).
33. For a good overview of litigation and policy aimed at improving 
conditions for students with disabilities, see generally Elizabeth Palley, The Role of 
the Courts in the Development and Implementation of the IDEA, 77 SOC. SERV. REV.
605 (2003).
746 Michigan State Law Review 2014:737
faced a slew of problems as the 1970s wore on.35 For example, there 
was initially very limited state and local capacity to comply with the 
funding distribution requirements of the ESEA, and Title I funding 
was improperly allocated.36 Especially given its changing political 
composition, the Supreme Court became increasingly skeptical about 
the efficacy of top-down governance arrangements.37 As such, the 
Court leaned on the concept of “local control” to limit the expansion 
of federal judicial involvement in desegregation and prevent federal 
judicial involvement in school finance reform, thus making school 
finance reform a state issue.38 Large-scale education reform efforts 
also faced significant political pushback, such as resistance against 
busing plans to desegregate school districts and the refusal of state 
legislatures to respond fully to court orders to reform funding states’ 
school-funding systems. Moreover, there was little indication that 
equalizing or increasing school funding was having the theorized 
effect on students’ learning opportunities.39
The education law and policy reforms that followed developed 
partly in response to such problems and the new politics that 
emerged during the early 1980s. The 1983 publication of A Nation at 
Risk, a report drafted under the Reagan administration by the 
National Committee on Educational Excellence, marked the 
beginning of significant changes in large-scale education reform.40
This report argued that the poor state of the U.S. education system 
constituted a national crisis because it failed to support U.S. 
34. For a good overview of litigation and policy aimed at improving 
conditions for ELLs, see generally David Nieto, A Brief History of Bilingual 
Education in the United States, 6 PERSP. ON URB. EDUC. 61 (2009).
35. See SUPERFINE, supra note 3, at 97-98 (discussing the interaction of 
several problems plaguing large-scale education reforms during the 1970s).
36. DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID 
FEDERAL REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 6-9 (2009) (discussing the history of Title 
I of the ESEA).
37. See SUPERFINE, supra note 3, at 98.
38. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-44 (1974) (citing the importance 
of local control in desegregation litigation); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973) (citing the importance of local control in 
school finance litigation).
39. Jay P. Greene & Julie R. Trivitt, Can Judges Improve Academic 
Achievement?, 83 PEABODY J. EDUC. 224, 225 (2008) (“[W]e find no evidence to 
suggest that student learning improves as a result of court-ordered changes in school 
finance systems.”).
40. See A NATION AT RISK, supra note 6 (“[T]he educational foundations of 
our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens 
our very future as a Nation and a people.”).
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international competitiveness in a world that was beginning to 
undergo globalization.41 As such, the report sparked a shift in the 
focus of education reform away from the educational needs of low-
income and minority students to that of the United States as a whole. 
Immediately after the report was released, the educational excellence 
movement swept through the states and sparked the passage of 
several laws and regulations aimed at increasing high school 
graduation requirements and implementing tests for students and 
teachers.42 Largely in response to these sorts of changes, a “second 
wave” of reforms swept through the United States in the mid- to late-
1980s that emphasized bottom-up change and increasing teacher 
professionalism by emphasizing the school building as the primary 
site of reform.43
Building on these movements, states began to institute 
standards-based reforms in the mid-1980s and through the 1990s. 
These reforms aimed at ensuring that all students learn particular sets 
of knowledge and skills within each grade and certain content areas 
as specified by standards. The logic of standards-based reform 
particularly framed the problem facing education as one of 
fragmented, incoherent policies that failed to create meaningful 
change in classroom practice.44 The federal government became 
directly involved in this type of reform as well with the 1994 passage 
41. Id. 
42. Richard Jung & Michael Kirst, Beyond Mutual Adaptation, into the 
Bully Pulpit: Recent Research on the Federal Role in Education, EDUC. ADMIN. Q.,
Summer 1986, at 80, 97 (surveying changes during the educational excellence 
movement). “During the mid-1980s, 41 states increased requirements for high 
school graduation, 29 states required that prospective teachers pass a standardized 
test either before entering training or as a condition for certification . . . .” Lorraine 
M. McDonnell, No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution 
or Revolution?, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 19, 27 (2005) (analyzing changes in the 
federal role in education). In addition, “40 States put new testing provisions into 
effect.” MICHAEL KIRST, ACCOUNTABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
POLICYMAKERS 1 (1990), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED318804.pdf 
(analyzing new accountability requirements created during the educational 
excellence movement).
43. Richard F. Elmore, Introduction: On Changing the Structure of Public 
Schools, in RESTRUCTURING SCHOOLS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM 1, 1 (1990) (analyzing factors influencing the success of school 
restructuring efforts).
44. See Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O’Day, Systemic School Reform, in 
THE POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING 233, 236-37 (Susan H. Fuhrman & 
Betty Malem eds., 1991) (discussing the problems of policy fragmentation and 
incoherence).
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of the Goals 2000: Educate America Act45 and the Improving 
America’s Schools Act (IASA), which reauthorized the ESEA.46
While Goals 2000 provided funding to states to engage in standards-
based reform, the IASA required states to engage in this reform as a 
condition of receiving continuing Title I funding. As such, law and 
policy reform efforts responded to the problems of past reforms by 
moving past issues far from the classroom that could easily be 
regulated (e.g. inequality of funds) and closer to classroom teaching 
and learning. At the same time, reforms were beginning to focus on 
adequacy for all students, restructuring school systems, and student 
performance with regard to set standards.
The passage of the American Recovery and Reform Act of 
2009 (ARRA) moved schools even further in this direction. The 
ARRA was designed to provide stability to the U.S. economy after 
the 2008 financial meltdown and to stimulate the economy. It was to 
be a one-time appropriation, passed under extraordinary 
circumstances. Of the $787 billion total funds, almost $80 billion 
were set aside for education.47 The primary lever for the new 
education reform efforts was the Race to the Top (RTT) competition. 
RTT was a competitive grant program in which states competed for a 
share of $4.35 billion.48 RTT particularly incentivized states to create 
new teacher evaluation systems that incorporated measures of 
student achievement into the way in which teachers were evaluated.49
As discussed below, many states followed the lead of the federal 
government by quickly developing and implementing such systems, 
and using these systems as the basis for critical decisions about 
teacher tenure and employment.50
To be sure, not all large-scale education reforms moved in the 
same direction. For example, school choice became an increasingly 
45. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, § 308, 108 
Stat. 125, 168 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 5888 (1995)).
46. See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 
108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1995)).
47. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115; John E. Chubb, The Learning Stimulus?, EDUC. WK. (July 15, 
2009), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/07/15/37chubb.h28.html. 
48. See id. §§ 14001, 14006; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., President 
Obama, U.S. Sec’y of Educ. Duncan Announce Nat’l Competition to Advance Sch. 
Reform (July 24, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/07/07242009.html.
49. See id. §§ 14005(d), 14006 (highlighting the importance of tying 
educator improvement strategies to performance-based incentive systems).
50. See GREENBERG, MCKEE & WALSH, supra note 11, at 63.
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popular reform strategy beginning in the early 1990s.51 Largely 
proceeding through charter school and voucher programs, school 
choice is ultimately aimed at improving school performance by 
giving individuals and local organizations the room to innovate, 
compete, and adapt to local conditions.52 However, much of the 
large-scale education law and policy reform currently focuses on
adequacy, the reform of school systems, and outcomes. It is precisely 
in this climate that recent changes in collective bargaining and 
teacher evaluation have emerged.
B. Changes in Teacher Workforce Policy
Although there has been a significant amount of law and policy 
focused on large-scale education reform since the civil rights era, 
teachers have become located at the center of this reform only 
recently. For most of U.S. history, states maintained the primary 
authority over the basic requirements for ensuring teacher quality, 
including requirements governing licensure, the approval of teacher 
education programs, professional development, and several aspects 
of compensation.53 The large majority of states also guaranteed 
tenure rights statutorily.54 Because such authority has resided at the 
state level, these requirements have varied across states.55 Substantial 
governance authority over teacher policy has traditionally resided at 
the local level as well. School-level administrators have been the 
primary entities responsible for evaluating teachers and selecting 
teachers’ curricula, and teachers have exercised their authority with 
much autonomy when they close the classroom door.56 As school 
51. In 2011, there were “more than 5,700 charter schools serving more than 
1.9 million students” in forty-one states. Choice & Charter Schools: Facts, CENTER 
FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/facts/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014). In 2010, only Louisiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and 
Washington, D.C. operated traditional voucher programs. School Vouchers, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-
vouchers.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
52. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS 185-220 (1990) (laying out the fundamentals of school choice theory).
53. See Thomas B. Corcoran, The Changing and Chaotic World of Teacher 
Policy, in THE STATE OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 307, 308-09 (David K. 
Cohen, Susan H. Fuhrman & Fritz Mosher eds., 2007). 
54. See id. at 316.
55. Id. 
56. LARRY CUBAN, HOW TEACHERS TAUGHT: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN 
AMERICAN CLASSROOMS 1890-1980, at 252-53 (1984) (discussing the tradition of 
teacher autonomy). 
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districts grew and federal and state governments enacted laws 
governing collective bargaining through the first half of the twentieth 
century, districts gained more authority over teacher employment 
decisions. Through collective bargaining processes, most school 
districts and teachers’ unions have agreed upon teacher 
compensation and procedural protections for teachers’ employment 
rights within the boundaries set by state law, and such processes 
have often generated intricate and often unwieldy processes for 
administrators to undertake when evaluating and firing teachers.57
Despite this historical emphasis on local control, education 
policies have swung back and forth between prioritizing teacher 
autonomy and oversight for much of the twentieth century. While 
education policies always have included some degree of teacher 
autonomy and oversight, one often has garnered more emphasis. For 
example, in the early part of the twentieth century, many states gave 
basic skills competency tests to teacher candidates.58 But as 
requirements for teachers to graduate from college and be certified to 
teach were enacted around the United States, states used these tests 
less often.59 During the 1960s and 1970s, “Competency/Performance 
Based Teacher Education” models similarly gained significant 
attention from the federal government as a way to improve teacher 
education through the application of systems and job analysis.60
However, these models ultimately had a minimal impact on teacher 
education programs.61
The 1980s marked the beginning of increasing state and federal 
involvement in teacher workforce policy. As noted above, education 
policies enacted by a large range of states during the educational 
excellence movement increased student testing and the use of
57. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING 
CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION] (surveying the landscape of 
collective bargaining law).
58. See Martha M. McCarthy, Teacher-Testing Programs, in THE 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980S, at 189, 189 (Joseph Murphy ed., 
1990).
59. Id.
60. See Kenneth M. Zeichner & Daniel P. Liston, Traditions of Reform in 
U.S. Teacher Education, 41 J. TCHR. EDUC. 3, 7 (1990) (discussing the history of 
reforms aimed at improving teacher education).
61. Id.
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standardized curriculum.62 The application of such management 
techniques arguably “deskilled” teachers by preventing them from 
employing their professional discretion.63 However, a second wave 
of state-level reforms in the mid-1980s was aimed at restructuring 
schools to promote autonomy and flexibility at the school level, and 
enhance teachers’ professional discretion.64 A movement to 
professionalize teachers, often by upgrading teachers’ skills and 
knowledge and providing teachers with more discretion, similarly 
emerged during the 1990s.65 In addition, the standards-based reform 
movement that emerged in states during this time formally 
constrained what teachers should teach through the explicit 
articulation of standards. However, it left pedagogical decisions in 
the hands of teachers. States’ increasing emphasis on educational 
outcomes and accountability put additional pressure on teachers to 
teach particular content and use particular methods. As such, federal 
and state policies governing standards, teacher evaluation, student 
testing, and accountability became increasingly important sources of 
authority governing teachers’ classroom practices.66
As also noted above, federal policy moved deeper into the core 
work of teaching with the passage of NCLB in 2002.67 By including 
much more robust testing and accountability requirements for 
schools than its predecessors, NCLB exerted strong pressure on 
teachers to “‘teach to the test’” (e.g. by narrowly emphasizing test-
taking skills) in many cases.68 Moreover, NCLB squarely focused 
federal policy on improving teachers’ performance by requiring there 
62. See William Lowe Boyd, Balancing Control and Autonomy in School 
Reform: The Politics of Perestroika, in THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF 
THE 1980S, supra note 58, at 85, 85-86 (discussing the move toward standards).
63. See LINDA M. MCNEIL, CONTRADICTIONS OF CONTROL: SCHOOL 
STRUCTURE AND SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE 185-86 (1986). 
64. See Boyd, supra note 62, at 86.
65. See generally Brian Rowan, Comparing Teachers’ Work with Work in 
Other Occupations: Notes on the Professional Status of Teaching, EDUC. RES., Aug.-
Sept. 1994, at 4, 4-6 (examining movements to professionalize teaching).
66. See MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND: NATIONAL EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION 
POLICY 1-2 (2009) (charting the rise of standards at the state and federal levels).
67. See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 §§ 1001-1908, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2012). 
68. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, FROM THE CAPITAL TO THE CLASSROOM:
YEAR 4 OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 103 (2006) (quoting Hillside 
Elementary Principal Michele Sandro), available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=301 (discussing several analyses of the 
relationship between NCLB and student test score gains).
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to be a highly qualified teacher (HQT) in every public school 
classroom.69 Moving even deeper into the core work of teaching, the 
ARRA and RTT incentivized states to enact policies that require the 
use of student achievement data as a significant part of teacher 
evaluation and, in turn, personnel decisions about teachers. So, 
recent reforms have focused on increasing teacher effectiveness, 
particularly through the specification of student outcomes, 
evaluation, and accountability. However, these reforms also narrow 
the traditional scope of teachers’ authority and notions about what 
constitutes effective teacher behavior. As such, many modern, large-
scale education reforms are squarely aimed at increasing teachers’ 
performance through a focus on adequacy, instituting system-wide 
changes, and student test scores.
II. TEACHER EVALUATION AND STUDENTS’ LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
The recent wave of laws aimed at teacher evaluation is 
ultimately aimed at equalizing and increasing student learning 
opportunities and performance. There is a growing consensus among 
the education research community that teachers are one of the most 
important influences on student learning and performance.70 Teacher
quality appears to be especially important for improving the learning 
opportunities of poor and minority students.71 However, teacher 
quality is inequitably distributed among students.72 In addition, most 
traditional teacher evaluation systems have yielded high ratings for 
almost every teacher.73 Still, the new laws aimed at enhancing 
teacher evaluation and accountability involve several problems, such 
as a host of psychometric problems that weaken the validity about 
whether teachers are performing acceptably and incentives poorly 
tailored for improving teachers’ performance.74 Perhaps most 
69. See 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2). While the definition of what constitutes an 
HQT varies for different types of teachers, NCLB generally requires teachers to 
have received a bachelor’s degree, be fully certified, and have demonstrated their 
knowledge and skills. Id. § 7801(23).
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., LAURA GOE, NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CTR. FOR TEACHER 
QUALITY, THE LINK BETWEEN TEACHER QUALITY AND STUDENT OUTCOMES: A
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 1 (2007), available at http://www.files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED521219.pdf.
72. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
74. See id. at 2.
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importantly, these systems fail to encourage teachers to engage in 
instructional practices that will generate the sorts of learning 
opportunities that all students need in the twenty-first century. 
This Part analyzes the recent wave of teacher evaluation laws 
that have been enacted. First, this Part examines the current 
landscape of teacher evaluation and accountability laws and 
particularly highlights the sort of instructional practices encouraged 
by these laws. Second, this Part analyzes the litigation that could 
potentially be generated by these laws as tenured teachers are fired 
on the basis of poor evaluations. Finally, this Part discusses the 
educational research bearing upon these laws.
A. The Current Landscape of Teacher Evaluation
The enactment of teacher evaluation and accountability 
systems has quickly become a strategy employed by both state and 
federal governments to improve teacher effectiveness and in turn, 
student performance. However, several pre-existing efforts have 
been in place at the state level for some time. The reform strategy of 
teacher evaluation particularly gained momentum in the mid-1980s 
as a way to improve students’ learning opportunties.75 By 1992,
thirty-eight states had in place legislation with specific requirements 
for teacher evaluation.76 Under most of these early teacher evaluation 
systems, principals and administrators were completely responsible 
for evaluating teachers, and almost all teachers were rated as 
performing satisfactorily.77
By the mid-2000s, some states had begun to focus more 
intensely on teacher evaluations and their relationship with student 
performance. For example, by this time Tennessee had developed a 
database linking student achievement gains on standardized tests to 
individual teachers and required teachers to be evaluated in six areas 
(such as planning and assessment of students).78 And by 2003, at 
least nine states had enacted laws encouraging teachers to be paid for 
performance, although only two states had in place policies that tied 
75. See Carole A. Veir & David L. Dagley, Legal Issues in Teacher 
Evaluation Legislation: A Study of State Statutory Provisions, 2002 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 1, 3.
76. See id.
77. See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
78. J. E. STONE, EDUC. CONSUMERS FOUND., POLICY HIGHLIGHTS FROM 
TENNESSEE’S RACE TO THE TOP APPLICATION 6-8 (2010), available at 
http://www.education-consumers.org/ECF_RTTT_Commentary.pdf.
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teacher evaluation to student achievement.79 Spurred in part by the 
ARRA and RTT, states adopted teacher evaluation and 
accountability policies more quickly in the late 2000s and early 
2010s. In 2009, only fourteen states required annual evaluations of 
all teachers, and four states required student achievement to be an 
important factor in assessing teacher performance. But by 2013, 
fourty states required teacher evaluations to include student
achievement data, thirty-five states required student growth to be the 
preponderant criterion, and twenty states tied evaluation to tenure 
decisions.80 Furthermore, twelve states made legislative 
modifications adding poor performance as a grounds for “just cause”
dismissal, eleven states made modifications requiring that reduction 
in force decisions may not be based entirely on seniority, and five 
states made modfications requiring teachers to lose their tenure 
protections after the receipt of a certain number of poor performance 
evaluations.81 The teacher evaluation systems that incorporate 
student achievement data often rely on value-added modeling 
(VAM), a statistical calculation that ties student growth on 
standardized achievement tests to particular teachers.82
While student achievement data is central in many recently 
enacted teacher evaluation systems, these systems include several 
other components as well. Many of these systems incorporate 
classroom observations conducted by administrators, who are 
generally the teachers’ principals.83 Some of these systems also use 
direct assessments of teacher knowledge and student ratings of 
teachers.84 Some of these systems include other sources of 
information as well, including ratings of teachers’ commitment to the 
school community, measures of teacher professionalism (such as 
unexcused teacher absences and late arrivals), and student test score 
79. Education Counts, EDUC. WK. (June 8, 2007), 
http://www.edweek.org/rc/2007/06/07/edcounts.html?intc-intst. 
80. NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 2013 STATE TEACHER POLICY 
YEARBOOK 10 (2014), http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/2013_State_Teacher_Policy_
Yearbook_National_Summary_NCTQ_Report; see also Ann Elizabeth Blankenship, 
Teacher Tenure: The Times, They Are a Changin’, 1 EDUC. L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 
200 (2014).
81. See id. at 203.
82. Id. at 216 & n.147.
83. See STEVEN GLAZERMAN ET AL., PASSING MUSTER: EVALUATING 
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS 14 (2011), available at 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~dstaiger/Papers/2011/passing%20muster%202011.pdf.
84. See id. at 3.
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gains for a teacher’s school.85 This push for teacher evaluation to 
become a central part of state education systems also has begun to 
infiltrate state laws governing teacher preparation—teacher 
preparation programs in a small handful of states are beginning to be 
assessed on the basis of evaluations of the teachers they produce.86
Notably, there has been strong political pushback to many of 
these changes, particularly from teachers’ unions. Randi Weingarten, 
president of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), repeatedly 
argued that teacher evaluation systems can improve student learning 
opportunities only when they are aimed at continually developing 
teachers’ skills instead of teacher accountability.87 Echoing historical 
criticisms of efforts to restrict teachers’ autonomy, Chicago Teachers 
Union (CTU) president Karen Lewis stressed during the 2012 CTU 
teacher strike that teacher evaluation and accountability systems 
focused on student achievement deskill teachers and make them less 
able to help students learn important knowledge and skills.88 At the 
very least, such criticisms from high-profile teachers’ union leaders 
underscore the contentious nature of these systems and potential not 
just for political blowback but legal blowback as well.
B. Teacher Evaluation and Potential Litigation
Given that new teacher evaluation and accountability systems 
threaten teachers’ job security in ways that they have not previously 
faced, there is the strong potential for adversely affected teachers to 
engage in litigation. Teachers who feel that they have been unfairly 
disciplined or fired as a result of poor ratings on evaluations may sue 
85. See id. at 1.
86. As reported by the National Comprehensive Center for Teacher Quality,
at least six states have enacted significant changes to their policies governing teacher 
preparation programs. JANE G. COGGSHALL, LAUREN BIVONA & DANIEL J. RESCHLY,
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TEACHER PREPARATION PROGRAMS FOR 
SUPPORT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (2012), available at http://www.gtlcenter.org/
sites/default/files/docs/TQ_RandP_BriefEvaluatingEffectiveness.pdf.
87. See Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT Statement on NCTQ’s 
2013 Teacher Evaluation Report (Oct. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.aft.org/newspubs/press/2013/102913.cfm.
88. Monica Davey & Steven Yaccino, Teachers End Chicago Strike on 
Second Try, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
09/19/us/vote-scheduled-on-chicago-teachers-contract.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
George N. Schmidt, Angry Union President Announces Teachers Ready to Strike 
Because of CPS and Emanuel Hypocrisy, Bullying, SUBSTANCE NEWS (Apr. 5, 
2012), http://www.substancenews.net/articles.php?page=3187. 
756 Michigan State Law Review 2014:737
schools or school districts in response to such actions.89 As 
Professors Green, Baker, and Oluwole argue, there are several 
potential approaches that teachers might take in such lawsuits, but a 
few stand out as the most likely: lawsuits involving Due Process 
Clause challenges, Equal Protection Clause challenges, and claims 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.90 While such litigation might 
serve as a needed protection for teachers’ rights, it ultimately would 
do little, and perhaps even work against, leveraging for stronger and 
more equal student learning opportunities that are attuned to the 
needs of the twenty-first century.
Because tenured teachers have explicitly articulated job 
protections under both state statute and collective bargaining 
agreements, they are the most likely to sue if adversely affected by 
teacher evaluation and accountability systems. Such teachers are 
particularly likely to bring Due Process Clause challenges. As the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, no “State 
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”91 A person can bring a procedural or substantive 
Due Process Clause challenge if he or she is deprived of a life, 
liberty, or property interest. One may establish deprivation of a 
liberty interest if a governmental act has imposed a stigma or 
disability that has damaged his or her standing in the community or 
diminished the freedom to find employment elsewhere.92 However, 
as Professors Green, Baker, and Oluwole argue, it is unlikely that 
teachers terminated under recently enacted teacher evaluation 
systems can establish a liberty interest—teachers who received 
unsatisfactory evaluations in part based on student achievement 
scores only failed to meet professional standards and did not have 
their ability to find employment elsewhere damaged.93
On the other hand, teachers may be able to establish a property 
interest if they are terminated on the basis of such evaluations.94 The 
Supreme Court found that teacher tenure derived from a state statute 
89. See Preston C. Green, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph Oluwole, The Legal 
and Policy Implications of Value-Added Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 1, 15-16.
90. See id. This article is used extensively in this Section to outline the 
potential legal bases for litigation brought in response to recently enacted teacher 
evaluation and accountability systems.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
93. Green, Baker & Oluwole, supra note 89, at 17 (citing St. Louis 
Teachers Union, Local 420 v. Bd. of Educ., 652 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1987)).
94. Id. at 17. 
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provides teachers with a property right to continued employment.95
However, Supreme Court cases from the last two decades indicate 
that the approach for identifying property interests under the Due 
Process Clause may change. Under the traditional approach to 
identifying property rights, as defined through Supreme Court 
decisions in cases such as Board of Regents v. Roth96 and Perry v. 
Sindermann,97 courts are required to determine whether an 
“independent source of authority constrains official discretion to 
remove a public employee, such that the employee has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to employment that is protected by due 
process.”98 Tenured teachers in several states would be able to 
establish property interests under such an approach.99 However, 
recent Supreme Court cases indicate that the Court may adopt a new 
analytic framework to replace this approach.100 This new framework 
could define a property interest on the basis of whether the 
deprivation of that interest would impose an “‘atypical and 
significant hardship’” on a party.101 In the context of education, this 
framework also would focus on whether teacher evaluation systems 
were enacted primarily for the benefit of students or teachers. As 
Camillucci argues, “Because none of the schemes primarily intend to 
benefit tenured teachers, dismissal of public teachers based on 
performance evaluations would not impose an atypical and 
significant hardship on those teachers, and they would not have a 
property interest in employment protected by due process.”102
Even if teachers can establish that they have a liberty or 
property interest, they still need to establish that adverse actions 
taken on the basis of teacher evaluation systems violate this right. As 
discussed below, the student achievement data used in teacher 
evaluation systems have high error rates and are impacted by several 
factors independent of an individual’s teaching. Because there is a 
95. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-48 (1985). 
96. 408 U.S. at 576-78.
97. 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
98. See Karl D. Camillucci, Regretting Roth? Why and How the Supreme 
Court Could Deprive Tenured Public Teachers of Due Process Rights in 
Employment, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 591, 594 (2013) (synthesizing Supreme Court 
cases defining property interests).
99. See id. at 610-15 (examining tenure protections in Colorado, Florida, 
Idaho, Illinois, and Michigan).
100. See id. at 624-27.
101. See id. at 624-25 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 
(1995)).
102. See id. at 637.
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high risk of erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the 
procedures used, teachers who have established a liberty or property 
interest may be successful at establishing that teacher evaluation 
systems violate procedural due process.
Although procedural due process challenges arguably have the 
greatest chances for success, there are several other approaches that 
teachers could potentially take in such litigation. They could bring 
substantive due process challenges in which a court must determine 
whether a fundamental right is present. Because there are no clear 
fundamental rights, courts would likely use the rational basis test. 
While there is the possibility that a court would find a teacher
evaluation system unconstitutional under this test because the use of 
student achievement data involves high error rates, there is no 
guarantee.103 Tenured teachers may also bring equal protection 
claims. In such cases, courts similarly would use the rational basis 
test. In addition, teachers could also bring claims under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. Such teachers would argue that minority 
teachers are disparately affected by teacher evaluation systems 
because they are more likely than white teachers to work in schools 
with low-income minority students, who tend to score lower on 
standardized tests.104 However, schools and districts could defend 
themselves against such claims by establishing a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.105
If teachers adversely affected by recently enacted teacher 
evaluation and accountability systems choose to engage in such 
litigation, their decisions would be understandable. Such litigation 
would serve as a potential form of protection against what many 
teachers will likely perceive to be unfair decisions. However, this 
type of litigation would reflect and even exacerbate the problems 
already inherent in teacher evaluation systems. First, the litigation 
would only act as a shield against the problems of teacher evaluation 
systems and would do little for improving them in a way that would 
enhance students’ learning opportunities.106 In this way, the litigation 
103. See Green, Baker & Oluwole, supra note 89, at 23.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 25. To be sure, the teachers could counter that there is a “less 
racially discriminatory alternative.” Id. Yet again, there is no guarantee that such a 
claim would succeed, and courts have long been hesitant to second-guess 
legislatures, districts, and schools on technical matters of education policy.
106. There is the possibility that a significant amount of such litigation 
would push states to modify their teacher evaluation systems to be more strongly 
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would only pit teachers against schools and districts instead of more 
directly acting toward school improvement.
Second, the analytic frameworks used in due process litigation 
could actually encourage teachers to act in ways that treat education 
reform as a zero-sum game between teacher benefits and student 
benefits. Under some Supreme Court cases, teachers’ claims are at 
their strongest when reforms are intended to benefit them rather than 
the students.107 So, teachers ultimately would be encouraged to push 
for reforms that solely protect them from the unfair actions of 
administrators. But as discussed below, such an approach does not 
square with the kind of reform needed to generate stronger learning 
opportunities for students in line with the demands of the twenty-first 
century—teachers and administrators must work together to create 
an environment in schools that supports the kind of professional 
behavior needed to create these learning opportunities.108 As such, 
litigation generated in response to teacher evaluation systems has the 
paradoxical potential to degrade students’ learning opportunities to 
an even greater extent.
C. Research on Teacher Evaluation Systems
Although there is not much empirical research that directly 
relates to teacher evaluation and accountability systems, the extant 
research indicates that they likely will not improve or equalize 
students’ learning opportunities in the intended fashion. On one 
hand, these reforms are based on the theory that they will help 
schools and districts hire and retain the most effective teachers, and 
incentivize low-performing teachers to improve; by focusing on 
student achievement gains and administrators’ observations, these 
systems can provide the foundation for evidence-based decisions 
about critical teacher employment decisions, including tenure.109
Indeed, there is a strong consensus among educational researchers 
that teachers are one of the most important factors influencing 
student learning.110 Teachers are especially important for improving 
grounded in evidence, especially if coupled with a high-profile and savvy media 
strategy. However, such an impact could take years.
107. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
109. See Camillucci, supra note 98, at 644-45.
110. See, e.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student 
Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
ARCHIVES 1, 9 (2000).
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the learning opportunities of poor and minority students.111 On the 
other hand, teachers traditionally have not received robust 
evaluations on any consistent basis, and teacher evaluation systems 
have generally failed at identifying effective and ineffective 
teachers.112
Despite the potential of recently enacted teacher evaluation and 
accountability systems to resolve such problems, these systems have 
several serious weaknesses. As discussed above, they often employ 
VAM, which uses data from student achievement tests that have not 
been validated for these models.113 Such test data especially may 
involve “floor” or “ceiling” effects, which means that they are 
ineffective at determining scores for low or high achieving 
students.114 In order to validate these systems and the use of student 
achievement data, states would need to undertake validity studies, 
which would involve convening groups that include 
psychometricians, expert teachers, and experts in subject matter, in 
addition to conducting operational administrations of assessments, 
special research studies, and potentially large-scale field tests.115
While some of this work has already begun, much more needs to be 
completed, especially to the extent that teacher evaluations are used 
for high-stakes accountability purposes.116
Moreover, there is a large range of factors, other than teachers, 
that drive student performance.117 For example, VAM generally does 
not account for the influences on progress in students’ achievement 
111. See, e.g., GOE, supra note 71, at 1.
112. See GLAZERMAN ET AL., supra note 83, at 3.
113. See Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Methodological Concerns About the 
Educational Value-Added Assessment System, 37 EDUC. RES. 65, 66-67 (2008).
114. Rodney S. Whiteman, Dingjing Shi & Jonathan A. Plucker, Revamping 
the Teacher Evaluation Process, 9 EDUC. POL’Y BRIEF 1, 7 (2011), available at
http://www.ceep.indiana.edu/projects/PDF/PB_V9N4_2011_EPB.pdf.
115. See JOAN L. HERMAN, MARGARET HERITAGE & PETE GOLDSCHMIDT,
DEVELOPING AND SELECTING ASSESSMENTS OF STUDENT GROWTH FOR USE IN 
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS 3-5 (2011), available at
https://www.cse.ucla.edu/products/policy/shortTermGrowthMeasures_v6.pdf. States 
generally have not undertaken validity studies of the use of VAM in teacher 
evaluation systems.
116. THOMAS J. KANE ET AL., HAVE WE IDENTIFIED EFFECTIVE TEACHERS?
VALIDATING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVE TEACHING USING RANDOM ASSIGNMENT 2
(2013), available at http://www.metproject.org/downloads/MET_Validating_Using_
Random_Assignment_Research_Paper.pdf (indicating that measures of teaching 
“effectiveness from the 2009-10 school year . . . identif[ied] teachers who produced 
higher average student achievement following random assignment”).
117. See Whiteman, Shi & Plucker, supra note 114, at 5.
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like family income, ethnicity, and ability. Accordingly, teachers who 
teach several ELLs or students with disabilities have shown lower 
student achievement gains than when they teach other students.118
There are also many influences within schools that affect student 
achievement gains other than teachers. For example, a science 
teacher who emphasizes mathematical modeling and computation 
may influence how a student scores on a mathematics achievement 
test. As a result, it would be very difficult to pin that student’s 
mathematics score gains to a particular teacher.119 The observational 
components of teacher evaluation systems also involve several 
potential problems. For example, in an early study of the 
implementation of an observational rubric, principals’ scores for 
teachers were often more lenient or severe than the external 
evaluators’.120 Given such problems, estimates of teachers’ 
performance have proven very unstable across tests, classes, and 
years.121 As such, the National Research Council’s Board on Testing 
and Assessment stated, “VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness . . . 
should not [be] used to make operational decisions because such 
estimates are far too unstable to be considered fair or reliable.”122
In addition to the problems of conducting the actual 
evaluations, teacher evaluation and accountability systems likely will 
118. LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, STANFORD CTR. FOR OPPORTUNITY POLICY 
IN EDUC., CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING AND SUPPORTING 
EFFECTIVE TEACHING 22-23 (2012), available at
https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/creating-comprehensive-
system-evaluating-and-supporting-effective-teaching.pdf.
119. See GENE V. GLASS, EDUC. POLICY RESEARCH UNIT, TEACHER 
EVALUATION 7.1, 7.8 (2004), available at http://www.nepc.colorado.edu/files/EPSL-
0401-112-EPRU.pdf.
120. See LAUREN SARTAIN, SARA RAY STOELINGA & EMILY KRONE,
RETHINKING TEACHER EVALUATION: FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF THE 
EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING PROJECT IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 6 (2010), available 
at https://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/rethinking-teacher-evaluation-findings-
first-year-excellence-teaching-project-chicago.
121. As reported by the Economic Policy Institute, one study of five large 
urban districts employing VAM for teacher evaluation found that among teachers 
ranked in the top 20% one year less than 33% were in that group the following year, 
and another third moved to the bottom 40%. EVA L. BAKER ET AL., PROBLEMS WITH 
THE USE OF STUDENT TEST SCORES TO EVALUATE TEACHERS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp278/. Another study found that VAM scores for 
teachers in one year could only predict 4% to 16% of the variation in these ratings in 
the next year. Id.
122. BD. ON TESTING & ASSESSMENT, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LETTER 
REPORT TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ON THE RACE TO THE TOP FUND 10
(2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12780.
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not have their intended effect of generally motivating teachers to 
perform better. Although there is some logic that data from these 
systems can help administrators employ incentives to motivate 
stronger performance, there is mixed evidence at best to support this 
notion.123 Because there are so many influences on student learning 
besides teachers, teacher evaluation and accountability reforms can 
discourage teachers from working in schools with poor and minority 
students.124 These reforms could reinforce the common practice of 
assigning inexperienced teachers to these students.125 Moreover, 
these reforms restrict teachers’ autonomy by intensifying teachers’ 
focus on particular learning objectives and tests. Yet, teachers highly 
value self-determinism, discretion, and authority over classroom 
work.126 Increasing external evaluation and controls therefore tends 
to minimize the intrinsic rewards and perceived meaningfulness of 
the work to teachers.127 Indeed, increased evaluation, characterized 
by a narrow focus on outputs, is often associated with private sector 
management techniques for work that does not involve high skill 
levels or motivation that transcends the terms of employment.128
Perhaps most importantly, teacher evaluation and 
accountability systems emphasize data from student assessments that 
involve a problematic vision of what students should learn. As 
123. On one hand, there is some recent evidence that teacher evaluation 
systems involving strong punishments (such as threats of dismissal) and rewards 
(such as very large merit pay bonuses) motivates very low-performing teachers to 
improve or leave teaching and high-performing teachers to improve even more. See 
Thomas Dee & James Wyckoff, Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: 
Evidence from IMPACT 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
19529, 2013), available at http://curry.virginia.edu/uploads/resourceLibrary/
16_Dee-Impact.pdf. On the other hand, there is other evidence that merit pay and the 
chance to move up a career ladder does not raise student test scores or achievement, 
especially when the potential merit pay is more modest. STEVEN GLAZERMAN &
ALLISON SEIFULLAH, AN EVALUATION OF THE TEACHER ADVANCEMENT PROGRAM 
(TAP) IN CHICAGO: YEAR TWO IMPACT REPORT 17 (2010), available at 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/education/tap_yr2_
rpt.pdf.
124. See Whiteman, Shi & Plucker, supra note 114, at 3.
125. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 118, at 22.
126. See CUBAN, supra note 56, at 270.
127. See Linda Darling-Hammond & Elle Rustique-Forrester, The 
Consequences of Student Testing for Teaching and Teacher Quality, in USES AND 
MISUSES OF DATA FOR EDUCATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMPROVEMENT 289, 297-
300 (Joan L. Herman & Edward H. Haertel eds., 2005).
128. See RAYMOND E. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY:
A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 6 (1964).
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argued by the Gordon Commission on the Future of Assessment in 
Education, assessments serve as statements about what educators, 
policymakers, and parents want their students to learn.129 Yet, current 
assessments generally fail to assess the knowledge and skills students 
need to succeed in the twenty-first century.130 These assessments fail 
to assess whether students can “evaluate the validity and relevance of 
[different] pieces of information and draw conclusions from 
them[,] . . . make conjectures and seek evidence to test them,” 
contribute to their job or community networks, and generally make 
sense of the world.131 Moreover, they fail to provide teachers with 
actionable information about their students and support high-quality 
instructional practices.132 In short, recently enacted teacher 
evaluation and accountability systems are aimed at laudable goals of 
improving and equalizing students’ learning opportunities. However, 
they involve several serious problems that weaken their potential to 
do so and perhaps even reinforce a view of learning that serves 
students poorly.
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TEACHING
Given the recent focus on increasing teacher effectiveness 
through enhanced teacher evaluation and accountability, many 
reforms have also focused on modifying states’ collective bargaining 
laws. In most states that have experienced such reform, collective 
bargaining laws frame the tenure and employment decisions that are 
implicated by teacher evaluation and accountability systems. These 
laws form the foundation and ultimately the boundaries for the 
collective bargaining agreements that can be made between school 
districts and local teachers’ unions. In some states, the legal 
requirements regarding collective bargaining with teachers’ unions 
simply have been modified to align with recently enacted teacher 
evaluation and accountability laws. However, laws governing 
collective bargaining for teachers have been more drastically 
modified and severely weakened in other states. In these states, 
changes include prohibition of bargaining over the placement of 
129. See THE GORDON COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF ASSESSMENT IN EDUC., A
PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 9 (2013), available at
http://www.gordoncommission.org/rsc/pdfs/gordon_commission_public_policy_rep
ort.pdf.
130. Id. at 7, 9.
131. Id. at 10.
132. See id. at 7, 10.
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teachers, structure of performance evaluation systems, and 
implementation of policy regarding teacher firing and discipline.
The wave of reform aimed at scaling back collective bargaining 
for teachers reflects the broader political pressure that teachers’ 
unions currently face. Teachers’ unions have a wide range of strong 
critics and supporters. Critics generally argue that teachers’ unions 
harm education by hamstringing administrative authority, preventing 
administrators from creating flexible staffing arrangements, 
protecting ineffective teachers, failing to reward effective teaching, 
and creating huge inefficiencies.133 Advocates of teachers’ unions 
argue that collective bargaining results in agreements produced by 
fair negotiations that protect teachers from unfair or unwise 
treatment from administrators.134 Some advocates further argue that 
collective bargaining is in fact a strong tool for enhancing teacher 
effectiveness—it provides the space for collaboration to “promote 
teacher ‘professionalism,’ peer review, differentiated compensation, 
and professional development.”135 It is worth noting that, while this 
debate has been highly politicized, it generally does not rest on 
strong attention to evidence. Given the deep influence that the 
landscape of laws governing collective bargaining between teachers’ 
unions and school districts can ultimately have on student learning 
opportunities, it is critical to examine these changes and claims about 
them with more attention to what we actually know and what we do 
not.
This Part accordingly examines the collective bargaining 
landscape for teachers, with a particular focus on how this landscape 
is rooted in a vision of teaching as industrial labor. First, this Part 
briefly discusses the history of collective bargaining for teachers. 
Second, this Part examines the current legal landscape. This Part 
highlights the ways in which different jurisdictions consider teacher 
evaluation and how these legal structures specifically frame the work 
of teaching. This Part also examines the wave of recent changes to 
collective bargaining laws that have weakened the power of teachers’ 
unions to engage in collective bargaining with school districts. Third, 
this Part examines professional unionism in education, which 
characterizes a more cooperative type of bargaining between unions 
133. Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, Albatross, or What? 
The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
EDUCATION, supra note 57, at 53, 53. 
134. Id.
135. Id.
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and districts. Finally, this Part examines research on the effects of 
teachers’ unions.
A. History
States began to enact collective bargaining laws for public 
sector workers like teachers in the 1960s.136 Since the enactment of 
laws allowing public sector workers to unionize, the number of 
unionized public sector workers has grown considerably.137 Thirty-
eight states have granted at least a portion of their public sector 
workers the right to unionize.138 Although collective bargaining 
began in the private sector, bargaining in the public sector has 
become widespread, and the proportion of public sector workers 
represented by unions has grown far greater than that of private 
sector workers. In 2012, 6.6% of private sector workers were 
represented by unions, while 35.9% of public sector workers were 
represented by unions.139 However, the ideas underlying states’ 
public sector bargaining laws extend back to those originally driving
bargaining in the private sector and particularly those underlying the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
Originally enacted as the Wagner Act and passed in 1935, the 
NLRA provided most private sector workers across the United States 
the right to collectively bargain through unions.140 This law was 
grounded in the assumption that collective bargaining would occur in 
a traditional industrial workplace.141 In this kind of workplace, 
management controls all decision making, and workers narrowly 
carry out tasks as decided by management.142 As such, the rules 
governing the relationship between management and employees are 
136. See Chris Edwards, Public-Sector Unions, TAX & BUDGET BULL., No. 
61 (CATO Inst.), March 2010, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/tbb_61.pdf.
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union 
Members—2012, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/union2_01232013.pdf.
140. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. I 1935)).
141. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and 
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 885, 897 (2007). This work provides a substantial amount 
of detail on the history of the NLRA.
142. Id.
766 Michigan State Law Review 2014:737
very rigid.143 In interpreting the NLRA, the Supreme Court stated 
that decisions about the core operations of business must be left 
entirely in the hands of management and workers only have the right 
to force bargaining over “‘wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.’”144 Under this logic, employees are 
granted protections that act as a shield against the unfair acts of more 
powerful management; employees are not permitted to direct the 
organizations in which they work through collective bargaining. As 
stated by Professors Malin and Kerchner, “a worker’s role is to obey 
and not to think” under the NLRA.145 Indeed, workers who exercise 
discretion and maintain some control over the direction of an 
enterprise are considered management rather than employees under 
the law.146 As the Supreme Court indicated in NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University, university faculty are considered management because 
they engage in managerial functions such as recruitment and hiring, 
tenure decisions, admissions, and setting curricula for courses.147
Teachers constitute one of the largest groups of public sector 
union members. The National Education Association (NEA) is the 
largest union in the country and has about 3.2 million members, and 
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has about 1.5 million 
members.148 Moreover, the proportion of teachers that are unionized 
is very high—in the 2007–2008 school year, 76.4% of public school 
teachers belonged to a union.149 Despite the current status of the NEA 
and AFT as large public sector unions, these organizations have not 
always focused on representing teachers through collective 
bargaining.150 The NEA was founded in 1857, and the AFT was 
founded in 1916.151 In these early years, the members of the NEA 
143. Id. 
144. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 667 (1981) (quoting 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)).
145. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 141, at 899.
146. Id.
147. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980).
148. See Monica Teixeira de Sousa, The State of Our Unions: How President 
Obama’s Education Reforms Threaten the Working Class, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
201, 233 (2011).
149. According to a recent federal report, 76.4% of public school teachers in 
2007–2008, down from 77.6% in 2003–2004 and 79.1% in 1999–2000, belonged to 
unions of employees’ associations. Schools & Staffing Survey (SASS), NAT’L 
CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sass0708_
043_t1s.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
150. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining 
Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, supra note 57, at 7, 7.
151. Id.
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largely considered the group to be a professional organization of 
teachers and administrators. Given the strong presence of 
administrators in the NEA, it was largely opposed to collective 
bargaining in the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, there 
was internal dissension in these organizations about the goals of any 
potential collective bargaining efforts—while female elementary 
teachers wanted a single salary scale, white male teachers wanted 
higher pay and salary differential based on the grade level of 
teaching.
Frustrated by what they considered poor working conditions 
and aware of the success of private sector unions, teachers’ unions 
forged sufficient internal compromise to begin collective bargaining 
efforts in the early 1960s.152 The AFT forged an internal compromise 
that differential pay should not be based on the grades taught but 
instead on teachers’ level of education and seniority. With this 
compromise in place, the local AFT union in New York City staged 
a strike, arguing that administrators did not treat teachers like other 
professionals who received higher pay, had greater autonomy, and 
were not treated arbitrarily by management.153 The number of 
teachers in unions dramatically expanded by the end of the 1960s, 
especially as the NEA officially recognized a right to strike in 
1969.154 Given the expansion of teachers’ union membership 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century, teachers’ unions gained 
significant political and financial power.155 Together, the annual 
revenue of the AFT and NEA is larger than $1 billion.156 By the mid-
2000s, the AFT was rated as the seventh largest donor to the 
Democratic Party, while the NEA was ranked twelfth.157
According to some observers, teachers are part of a class of 
growing professional workers that is unionizing. Over the past two 
decades, professional employees such as college professors, lawyers, 
and doctors have joined unions in increasing numbers.158 These types 
of employees join other groups traditionally considered to be 
professionals that have already unionized, such as journalists, 
152. Id. at 10-11. By the 1950s, private sector unions represented more than 
one-third of private sector workers and won large wage increases. Id. at 10. Such 
success influenced the shift of teachers’ unions toward collective bargaining. See id.
153. See id. at 11-13.
154. Id. at 14-15.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Id. at 16.
158. See Rabban, supra note 22, at 690.
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engineers, and nurses. However, observers do not universally 
consider teachers to be professionals.159 The National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) consideration of the law governing 
collective bargaining for teachers in Wordsworth Academy reflects 
this idea.160 According to the NLRB in Wordsworth Academy,
teachers only play a limited managerial role because they do not 
make recommendations to the administration in governance issues 
such as faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, firing, and promotion. 
Moreover, teachers must work with supervisors to determine the 
academic content to which students are exposed. Under this logic, 
teachers act like traditional industrial workers who inhabit a role at 
the bottom of a rigid hierarchy and proceed “in the manner directed 
by their employer.”161 Indeed, this basic principle of public sector 
collective bargaining law, rooted in the NLRA, continues to animate 
reform efforts currently aimed at modifying both collective 
bargaining and teacher evaluation and accountability systems.
B. The Current Landscape of Collective Bargaining Law in 
Education
Almost every state has in place laws permitting collective 
bargaining for teachers. Only five states—Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia—do not permit collective 
bargaining for teachers.162 Twenty-four states (including these five 
states) have in place “right-to-work” provisions under a state 
constitution or statute.163 In a right-to-work state, labor unions and 
159. See generally Barbara J. Dray & Cathy Newman Thomas, Teaching Is 
Not a Profession: How General and Special Education Teacher Education Have 
Failed, in 20 ADVANCES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION: RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY, AND TEACHER PREPARATION 187 
(Festus E. Obiakor, Jeffrey P. Bakken & Anthony F. Rotatori eds., 2010).
160. Wordsworth Acad., 262 N.L.R.B. 438, 443 (1982).
161. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 141, at 900. It is also worth noting 
that although many state statutes governing collective bargaining for teachers are 
directly rooted in the NLRA, the NLRB indicated that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Yeshiva showed that university faculty as management does not directly apply to 
public school teachers. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980); see 
also supra text accompanying note 147.
162. See Gus Lubin, The Five States Where Teachers Unions Are Illegal 
Have the Lowest Test Scores in America, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2011, 9:02 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/states-where-teachers-unions-are-illegal-2011-2.
163. The right-to-work states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
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employees may not require employees to join unions or pay union 
dues as a condition of employment. As such, the power of unions to 
form and bargain collectively is significantly weakened in these 
states. At the same time, collective bargaining is required by school 
districts if requested by a teachers’ union in thirty states, and fifteen 
states permit but do not require districts to engage in collective 
bargaining.164 In these states, bargaining can occur over a potentially 
wide range of issues, including teacher salaries, healthcare, grievance 
and dismissal procedures, length of the school day and year, and 
transfer and layoff procedures.165 Moreover, bargaining may occur 
over issues that border those that are sometimes left to 
administrators, such as class size, professional development, 
coaching, and student discipline.166 Independent of a teachers’ 
union’s ability to engage in collective bargaining, the First 
Amendment guarantees teachers the right to join a union and engage 
in certain union activities without being disciplined.167
In states that at least permit collective bargaining with teachers’ 
unions, statutes widely vary over the scope of what can and cannot 
be bargained. Moreover, many of the relevant provisions in state 
collective bargaining statutes are vague, which has paved the way for 
judicial and labor board interpretations of this scope. Under such 
state statutes and judicial decisions, the potential issues for collective 
bargaining generally fall into three categories: mandatory, 
permissive, and excluded.168 Mandatory issues are those that 
primarily relate to employee working conditions and over which 
teachers’ unions and school districts must bargain.169 In the case of 
teaching, mandatory issues directly affect teacher compensation and 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Right to Work States, NAT’L 
RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., INC., http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2014).
164. State Influence, NAT’L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY,
http://www.nctq.org/districtPolicy/stateInfluence.do (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
165. See Lindy, supra note 15, at 1133.
166. See William S. Koski, Teacher Collective Bargaining, Teacher Quality, 
and the Teacher Quality Gap: Toward a Policy Analytic Framework, 6 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 67, 73 (2012).
167. See, e.g., Federación de Maestros v. Anibal Acevedo-Vila, 545 F. Supp. 
2d 219, 223 (D.P.R. 2008). 
168. See Charles J. Russo, A Cautionary Tale of Collective Bargaining in 
Public Education: A Teacher’s Right or Tail Wagging the Dog?, 37 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 317, 330 (2012).
169. See Mark Paige, Applying the “Paradox” Theory: A Law and Policy 
Analysis of Collective Bargaining Rights and Teacher Evaluation Reform from 
Selected States, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 21, 26.
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working conditions and generally include salary, hours, pension, and 
healthcare.170
Permissive issues are those that can be bargained if a school 
district and union choose.171 These issues are generally those that do 
not primarily relate to working conditions but are not solely set aside 
for management.172 Permissive issues may begin to touch upon 
matters of education policy, such as defining educational objectives 
and textbook selection.173 It is worth noting that placement of an 
issue in the permissive category often means in practice that a school 
district will refuse to bargain over the issue, essentially foreclosing 
bargaining and teacher input over the issue.174
Finally, issues that are excluded cannot be bargained over, 
regardless of the wishes of a union and school district. Some 
excluded issues are those defined by statute that protect certain terms 
and conditions of teacher employment, such as due process 
protections for teacher tenure, rules governing the compensation 
schedule for teachers (often requiring that teachers are paid on the 
basis of experience, training, and education), and layoff 
procedures.175 Other excluded issues are those considered to relate to 
education policy and require managerial discretion, such as staffing 
and principal appointment.176
Despite this framework, many potential issues for bargaining 
do not clearly fall into one of these three categories under state 
statutes. As a result, issues that are permissive or excluded in one 
state may be mandatory in another.177 Such issues “include class size, 
workload, student discipline, calendar, [professional 
development,] . . . and guidelines for promotion, tenure, and 
retrenchment.”178 Where state statutes are vague, courts and 
administrative boards often decide the categories into which certain 
issues fall. These decisions often depend on the extent to which an 
issue is related to teacher working conditions or managerial 
170. Koski, supra note 166, at 71.
171. Paige, supra note 169, at 26.
172. Id.
173. See Koski, supra note 166, at 71.
174. See Rabban, supra note 22, at 714 (“[D]eclaring governance a 
permissive subject . . . can also undermine traditional means of professional 
influence.”).
175. See Koski, supra note 166, at 71.
176. See Russo, supra note 168, at 331.
177. Rabban, supra note 22, at 706.
178. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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discretion or public policy.179 As discussed above, an issue should be 
classified as mandatory the closer it relates to working conditions, 
while an issue should be classified as excluded the closer it relates to 
managerial discretion or public policy. Discussing the theoretical 
roots of this framework, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that 
the “foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if 
decisions on significant matters of governmental policy were left to 
the process of collective negotiation, where citizen participation is 
precluded.”180 However, classifying issues as either relating to 
working conditions or managerial authority or policy is complex and 
laden with value judgments. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
stated, “every managerial decision in some way relates to salaries, 
wages, hours, and other working conditions, and is therefore 
arguably negotiable.”181 “At the same time, virtually every such 
decision also involves educational policy considerations and is 
therefore arguably nonnegotiable.”182
Teacher evaluation particularly reflects the problems in making 
such decisions. As Professors Malin and Kerchner argued, 
“[e]valuations can affect job security, pay, and assignments. 
However, how evaluations are conducted also raises questions of 
educational policy.”183 As such, states have classified teacher 
evaluation differently. For example, courts and labor boards in 
Connecticut, Maine, and New Hampshire found that teacher 
evaluation systems are a permissive subject of bargaining.184 On the 
other hand, states such as Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin have 
prohibited bargaining over the process and substance of teacher 
evaluations.185 Kansas takes a more nuanced approach by requiring 
bargaining over procedures for evaluating teachers but only 
179. See Paige, supra note 169, at 25-26.
180. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 393 A.2d 
278, 287 (N.J. 1978).
181. Montgomery Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980, 986 
(Md. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id.
183. Malin & Kerchner, supra note 141, at 917.
184. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ. v. Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations, 519 
A.2d 41, 44 (Conn. 1986); In re Pittsfield Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 594, 597 (N.H. 
1999); Saco-Valley Teachers Ass’n v. MSAD No. 6 Bd. of Dirs., No. 79-56 (Me. 
Labor Relations Bd. 1979), available at
http://www.maine.gov/mlrb/decisions/ppc/79-56.htm.
185. See Paige, supra note 169, at 30.
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permitting bargaining over evaluation criteria.186 Teacher evaluation 
has also become a central issue in Doe v. Deasy, a case decided in 
2012, in which the California Superior Court ordered Los Angeles 
Unified School District (LAUSD) to include student progress in 
teacher evaluations.187 The litigation particularly involved an unfair 
labor practice charge filed by United Teachers Los Angeles that 
LAUSD intended to implement changes to evaluation procedures 
without collectively bargaining those changes.188 Although the court 
ruled that LAUSD had some discretion about how to include student 
progress, the court emphasized that such inclusion is required by 
state statute and cannot be ignored because of the collective 
bargaining process.189
Decisions about how to classify potential issues for bargaining 
can fundamentally shape the relationships between teachers and 
schools. If an issue is not classified as mandatorily negotiable, a 
district can unilaterally cut out a teachers’ union from decision 
making over that issue.190 A district or school can then go even 
further by selecting individual teachers and administrators to provide 
input. At the same time, teachers’ unions may engage in “impact 
bargaining”—even if an issue is excluded, unions may bargain over 
facets of that issue that impact employee terms and working 
conditions.191 For example, although some courts have found that the 
length of the school day is not mandatory, the exact hours and 
compensation associated with extended hours could be bargained.192
Given both impact bargaining and the principle that matters of 
educational policy and managerial discretion should not be 
mandatory, collective bargaining is channeled toward “bread-and-
butter” issues.193 As a result, collective bargaining agreements often 
focus on shielding teachers against decisions imposed by schools and 
districts and deemphasize the broader policy facets of an issue. 
186. See Bd. of Educ., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 314 v. Kan. Dep’t of Human 
Res., 856 P.2d 1343, 1345 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Bd. of Educ. v. NEA-Goodland, 
785 P.2d 993, 994 (Kan. 1990).
187. Doe v. Deasy, BS 134604, at 24 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012), available at
http://edvoice.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/Doe%20v%20%20Deasy%20
Tentative%20Ruling%20Compact%20PDF.pdf.
188. Id. at 11-12.
189. Id. at 25.
190. See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Law, 84 IND. L.J.
1369, 1389 (2009).
191. See Paige, supra note 169, at 26.
192. See id. at 26-27.
193. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 141, at 921.
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As noted by Professors Malin and Kerchner, teachers often 
wish to provide input on several important policy issues but cannot 
because the structure of collective bargaining processes is not geared 
for such action.194 For example, teachers often seek a voice on issues 
like curriculum reform, student assessment, and the allocation of 
resources for remedial assistance.195 However, these issues are not 
easily classified in terms of wages or working conditions. Teacher 
evaluation presents a particularly tricky situation because it involves 
the hiring, evaluation, and retention power of schools and districts. 
Indeed, such thinking is reflected in the states that have recently 
classified teacher evaluation as excluded.196
Some critics have noted the potentially harmful effects of such 
legal principles. According to these critics, collective bargaining law 
in education does not provide an environment that facilitates the 
development of high-performance schools.197 In high-performance 
workplaces, employees generally take responsibility in an 
organization for decision making in their areas of expertise. 
Although collective bargaining law does not necessarily prevent 
teachers and administrators from developing such a relationship, it 
provides a foundation for a more industrial-style relationship. 
Similarly, although teacher “buy-in” to education policy and 
administrative decision making are critical factors in school 
performance, collective bargaining law does little to facilitate 
relationships that engender this sort of support.198 Moreover, when 
teachers’ unions are blocked from negotiating over issues, they in 
turn often focus on blocking the implementation of reforms in ways 
available to them.199
It is also worth noting that collective bargaining laws typically 
include provisions for “exclusive representation” that drive 
bargaining in a similar direction. Exclusive representation for 
teachers generally means that school districts cannot bargain with 
any other teachers and must bargain only with a teachers’ union—the 
194. Id. at 922.
195. Id. 
196. See Paige, supra note 169, at 30.
197. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 190, at 1379.
198. See Jennifer A. Mueller & Katherine H. Hovde, Theme and Variation in 
the Enactment of Reform: Case Studies, in THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP:
UNDERSTANDING REFORM IN HIGH SCHOOLS 21, 24-25 (Jonathan A. Supovitz & 
Elliot H. Weinbaum eds., 2008). 
199. See Paige, supra note 169, at 28.
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exclusive bargaining representative.200 If a district attempts to 
bargain with individual teachers or groups of teachers, it engages in 
an illegal strategy of “divid[ing] and conquer[ing].”201 As Professor 
Rabban argues, the principle of exclusive representation threatens the 
ability of professional employees to exercise their expertise and 
engage in collegial decision making.202 And although the NLRB and 
courts have not focused on the impact of exclusive representation on 
a professional workplace, the NLRB has noted that exclusive 
representation may weaken professional governance.203
In short, collective bargaining laws in education are present in 
a majority of states, but they often narrowly circumscribe the role of 
teachers’ unions. While these laws are written differently, they are 
generally rooted in the conception of industrial labor. They focus on 
protecting teachers from the whims and potentially unwise decisions 
of educational administration. As discussed below, they also create a 
legal environment that does not naturally support the development of 
high-performing schools that provide high-quality and equal learning 
opportunities for students.204 Especially in concert with recent
teacher evaluation legislation, current collective bargaining laws may 
actually work against this goal.
C. Recent Changes to Collective Bargaining Laws for Teachers
Several states recently have made significant changes to their 
collective bargaining laws. Since 2010, at least twelve states have 
modified their laws governing the extent to which public employees 
can bargain over a range of different issues.205 In education, these 
issues include tying teacher compensation to evaluation, lengthening 
the time it takes for teachers to achieve tenure, and streamlining 
procedures for teacher discipline and firing.206 In some cases, these 
laws entirely prohibited bargaining over such issues. In addition, 
while some states that had recently enacted teacher evaluation 
200. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3543(a) (West 2009).
201. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON 
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 502-04 (2d ed. 2004); 
Rabban, supra note 22, at 693.
202. See Rabban, supra note 22, at 693.
203. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 n.31 (1972).
204. See infra notes 247-54.
205. See Malin, supra note 16, at 533. This article is used extensively in this 
Section to identify states that have recently changed their teacher collective 
bargaining laws.
206. See Koski, supra note 166, at 69.
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systems focused on aligning their collective bargaining laws with 
these systems, other states made more sweeping changes to their 
collective bargaining laws. 
For example, Idaho restricted collective bargaining for teachers 
to issues of compensation, which were defined as salary and benefits, 
including insurance and leave.207 However, Idaho voters rejected this 
law in November 2012.208 Indiana made similar changes by 
restricting collective bargaining for teachers to wages, salary, and 
wages related to fringe benefits like insurance.209 The state prohibited 
bargaining for teachers over everything else and expressly prohibited 
bargaining over teacher evaluation, dismissal procedures and criteria, 
the school calendar, and restructuring options.210 Although collective 
bargaining was already limited in Michigan, the state recently 
prohibited bargaining over a range of issues, including teacher 
placement, reductions in the teaching force, performance evaluation 
systems, policy regarding teacher discipline or firing, and the role of 
evaluation in performance-based compensation.211
Tennessee replaced the possibility of collective bargaining with 
a process called “‘collaborative conferencing.’”212 Under this 
process, teachers can file a petition to engage in collaborative 
conferencing with a school district if 15% of the teachers show 
interest.213 Both the district and teachers must meet and confer to 
exchange information, opinions, and proposals on the terms and 
conditions of professional employee service over issues such as 
salaries, grievance procedures, and payroll deductions.214 However, 
the statute does not require the parties to reach an agreement and 
allows a school board to set the terms and conditions if no agreement 
can be reached.215 Moreover, collaborative conferencing cannot 
occur over teacher evaluation, staffing decisions, and differential pay 
plans and incentive compensation.216
Perhaps the most high-profile attack on collective bargaining in 
education occurred in Wisconsin. Under the leadership of Governor 
207. Malin, supra note 16, at 542 (citing S. 1108 § 17, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Idaho 2011)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.; S. 575 § 10, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011).
211. Malin, supra note 16, at 543.
212. Id. at 551; TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605 (2014).
213. § 49-5-605.
214. Malin, supra note 16, at 552; § 49-5-602(2).
215. Malin, supra note 16, at 552; § 49-5-609(d).
216. Malin, supra note 16, at 552-53; § 49-5-608(b)(1)-(4).
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Scott Walker, the State passed a law limiting teachers’ unions from 
bargaining on issues other than base wages for approximately two-
thirds of the school districts.217 The law also required teachers to 
significantly increase their contributions to their retirement and 
health insurance premiums.218 This law was passed without any 
support of State Democrats and sparked vicious political fights 
during its consideration, including the flight of fourteen democratic 
members of the Wisconsin State Senate from the State to delay a 
vote on the law.219 Similar efforts emerged in Ohio. The law in Ohio 
limited bargaining between teachers’ unions and school boards over 
salary.220 However, this law was quickly repealed by voter 
referendum by a twenty-two point margin.221 So although many 
states have recently modified their collective bargaining laws to align 
with the recent enactment of teacher evaluation systems, some states 
have significantly weakened the power of teachers’ unions to bargain 
over a range of other issues as well.
D. Professional Unionism
Although collective bargaining in education is typically 
characterized as a zero-sum game that treats teaching much like 
industrial labor, the concept of professional, or reform unionism, 
offers a different view of bargaining. Under this concept, teachers’ 
unions are characterized by an emphasis on “teacher professionalism 
in service of student learning.”222 The idea of professional unionism 
largely grew from the work of Albert Shanker, former president of 
217. Russo, supra note 168, at 333-34.
218. See id. (citing Amy Merrick, Wisconsin Union Law to Take Effect,
WALL ST. J., June 15, 2011, at A2) (providing that under the new law, teachers are 
required to contribute 5.8% of their salaries toward their retirement and at least 
12.6% of the cost of health insurance premiums).
219. Russo, supra note 168, at 333-34; see also Scott Bauer, All Wisconsin
Dems Flee Capitol to Slow Anti-Union Steamroller, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, 
at 2.
220. Notably, the law continued to allow bargaining over health care, sick 
time, and pension benefits. Ohio’s SB 5, Explained, STATEIMPACT,
http://stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/tag/sb-5/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
221. See Michele McNeil, Ohio Vote to Scrap Bargaining a Labor Victory—
for Now, EDUC. WK. (Nov. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/11/10/12election.h31.html?qs=michele+m
cneil.
222. See Daniel F. Jacoby & Keith Nitta, The Bellevue Teachers Strike and 
Its Implications for the Future of Postindustrial Reform Unionism, 26 EDUC. POL’Y
533, 534 (2011).
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AFT, who began using the term “reform unionism” in the 1980s as 
public concern about the state of U.S. education and the 
accompanying scrutiny of teachers’ unions rose in the wake of the 
publication of A Nation at Risk.223 In a 1997 speech to the National 
Press Club in Washington, D.C., Bob Chase, president of the NEA, 
also argued for a new kind of unionism, calling for a reinvention of 
teachers’ unions.224 Though widely covered, little change in the 
NEA’s approach to unionism came from his speech. The Teacher 
Union Reform Network (TURN), which consisted of roughly a 
dozen local unions, also advocated for professional unionism. While 
members of TURN have adopted some policies designed to promote 
the tenets of professional unionism, these policies have been limited 
in both scope and impact.225
Professional unionism in education is focused on issues of 
teaching and learning to a much greater extent than traditional 
unionism in education. The first core tenet of professional unionism 
is “joint custody,” shared by the union and the district, of any 
reform.226 The second tenet is union and management collaboration, 
characterized by collegial working relations and ongoing problem 
solving, rather than periodic negotiations.227 The final tenet is a 
shared concern for public interest, in which the union assumes partial 
responsibility for the long-term success of the institution and is not 
solely focused on bread-and-butter issues for its members.228 In 
contrast, industrial unionism has been characterized by separation 
between labor and management, adversarial bargaining, and an 
emphasis on self-interest and protection of teachers.229
Professional unionism accordingly involves an approach to 
bargaining known as interest-based bargaining. Professor Koppich 
223. See id. at 537; TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS 
AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 245 (2011). Among education researchers, 
Kerchner & Koppich, in their book A Union of Professionals, also argued for reform 
unionism. See generally A UNION OF PROFESSIONALS: LABOR RELATIONS AND 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (Charles Taylor Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter A UNION OF PROFESSIONALS].
224. See MOE, supra note 223, at 247.
225. See id. at 248-49.
226. See Julia E. Koppich, Getting Started: A Primer on Professional 
Unionism, in A UNION OF PROFESSIONALS, supra note 223, at 194, 194.
227. See id. at 195.
228. See id.
229. See Julia Koppich, Addressing Teacher Quality Through Induction, 
Professional Compensation, and Evaluation: The Effects on Labor-Management 
Relations, 19 EDUC. POL’Y 90, 92-93 (2005).
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describes this type of bargaining as using a collaborative approach 
rather than an adversarial approach, in which both parties are 
positioned as working together to address common issues.230 Interest-
based bargaining is integrative, rather than distributive, in which 
approach to bargaining allows the union and management to strive 
“to identify common goals and reach agreements that have mutual 
advantage”231 and use what is best for students as the “litmus test” for 
any proposed idea.232 The contracts that stem from interest-based 
bargaining potentially include a larger range of issues than traditional 
contracts and have been described as “living contract[s]” in which 
problems are addressed as they arise instead of every few years when 
it becomes time to renew the contract.233
Professional unionism potentially offers several benefits that 
may foster conditions that promote high-performance schools and 
increased learning opportunities for all students. First, as reflected by 
its name, professional unionism could increase professionalism, both 
in reality and perception, of the teaching workforce. By replacing 
rigid work rules with more expansive and flexible contracts, teachers 
arguably have increased freedom to teach in ways that best meet the 
learning needs of their students. Additionally, professional unionism 
could promote a shift away from the conception of teaching as 
industrial labor and towards a conception of teaching as a profession. 
Professional unionism also could encourage a less adversarial 
bargaining process, especially if issues are being negotiated as they 
arise, rather than attempting to resolve several years’ worth of issues 
each time a contract needs to be renegotiated. Finally, professional 
unionism could allow districts to have more flexibility to adapt to 
changing policy environments.
Despite these potential benefits, there are strong barriers to 
engaging in professional unionism. First, it would require new skills 
and training for union leaders and their district counterparts.234
Furthermore, despite the tension between the potentially negative 
effects of teachers’ unionism on teaching work and the need to 
promote schools that offer all students educational opportunities, 
there are few incentives for unions to adopt a more professional type 
230. Id. at 94.
231. See id.
232. See Adam Urbanski, Improving Student Achievement Through Labor-
Management Collaboration in Urban School Districts, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 503, 516 
(2003).
233. See id.
234. See Koppich, supra note 226, at 201-02.
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of unionism or practice interest-based bargaining.235 To adopt 
professional unionism would mean putting the common interests of 
the school system and the students above the interests of the 
members. As Professor Moe argues: 
The unions are not in the business of representing children. It is not their 
goal to create a school system that is organized for truly effective 
performance. They are driven by their own interests, and those special 
interests are in the driver’s seat even when the unions engage in 
‘reform.’236
Under this logic, it is unlikely that widespread professional unionism 
will ever happen because it would require unions to shift their focus 
away from bread-and-butter issues to the promotion of reforms and 
policies that may not be popular with their members.
E. Empirical Research on Collective Bargaining
Despite the high profile and often highly politicized debates 
about collective bargaining in education, there is very limited 
empirical research on this issue. Little is actually known about the 
effects of collective bargaining in education.237 However, there is 
some research exploring the effects of collective bargaining on work 
rules, the teacher workforce, and student achievement, in addition to 
case studies of interest-based bargaining.
Research on the effects of collective bargaining on teacher 
work rules generally shows that the presence of unions and collective 
bargaining tends to make teaching work more bureaucratic.238 In his 
review of the effects of labor contracts on teaching work, Professor 
Kerchner found that the scope of contracts tended to expand over 
time and that teaching has become more bureaucratized and 
structured, which contradicts the avowed goals of union leaders to 
promote teacher professionalism.239 This occurs because the primary 
instrument of collective bargaining “is the creation of new, written 
235. See Koppich, supra note 229, at 94.
236. MOE, supra note 223, at 274.
237. See Susan Moore Johnson & Morgaen L. Donaldson, The Effects of 
Collective Bargaining on Teacher Quality, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
EDUCATION, supra note 57, at 111, 112; Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherman, 
Introduction to COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, supra note 57, at 1, 1.
238. Charles Taylor Kerchner, Union-Made Teaching: The Effects of Labor 
Relations on Teaching Work, 13 REV. RES. EDUC. 317, 318 (1986); Douglas E. 
Mitchell et al., The Impact of Collective Bargaining on School Management and 
Policy, 89 AM. J. EDUC. 147, 151 (1981).
239. See Kerchner, supra note 238, at 318, 321, 339.
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rules of behavior.”240 These new rules have been used particularly to 
standardize teaching behavior, a trend that continues to be present in 
recent teacher evaluation policies. In a series of case studies, 
Professors Mitchell and Kerchner also found that the presence of a 
union and collective bargaining created an emphasis on work rules, 
and caused teaching to be more highly inspected.241 Moreover, in 
districts with more powerful unions, collective bargaining 
agreements contain more detailed rules about a variety of work rules, 
including evaluation policies, transfer rights, class size, length of the 
school day and school year, and frequency of faculty meetings.242 In 
sum, more powerful unions are significantly related to the 
restrictiveness of collective bargaining agreements, which in turn 
further bureaucratizes teaching work.
Like the effect of collective bargaining overall, there is little 
evidence about the effect of collective bargaining on the quality of 
the teacher workforce.243 While there is not sufficient data to support 
conclusions about the effect of collective bargaining on the quality of 
the teacher workforce as a whole, there is some evidence that 
collective bargaining does impact key teacher workforce policies, 
especially compensation and teaching assignments. A historical 
analysis suggests that collective bargaining is related to a 12-15% 
increase in teacher compensation, but this fails to take into account 
other factors.244 In addition to this relationship to higher salaries, 
collective bargaining is also related to the extent to which districts 
frontload or backload their salary structures. Front-loading a salary 
structure means that larger compensation increases occur earlier in 
the teacher’s career, while back-loaded salary structures give larger 
raises to veteran teachers.245 Despite the positive relationship 
between front-loaded salary structures and student proficiency rates,
districts with collective bargaining in place are more likely to have 
back-loaded salary structures.246
240. Id. at 323-24.
241. See id. at 324; Mitchell et al., supra note 238, at 185.
242. See Katharine O. Strunk & Jason A. Grissom, Do Strong Unions Shape 
District Policies? Collective Bargaining, Teacher Contract Restrictiveness, and the 
Political Power of Teachers’ Unions, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS
389, 401-02 (2010).
243. See Johnson & Donaldson, supra note 237, at 111, 113.
244. Id. at 115.
245. Jason A. Grissom & Katharine O. Strunk, How Should School Districts 
Shape Teacher Salary Schedules? Linking School Performance to Pay Structure in 
Traditional Compensation Schemes, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 663, 665 (2012).
246. Id. at 665, 685.
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Collective bargaining is often accused of preventing the 
assignment of highly effective teachers to struggling schools and 
increasing the disparities between schools that serve high-minority or 
high-poverty communities and schools that do not serve 
predominantly minority or low-income communities.247 This is 
largely because many collective bargaining agreements contain strict 
provisions regarding transfers and vacancy, in which more senior 
teachers are given preference in school assignments. Professors 
Cohen-Vogel, Feng, and Osborne-Kampkin found that districts with 
more restrictive collective bargaining agreements “appear to have 
lower shares of high-quality teachers, as measured by professional 
certification, National Board Certification, experience, and SAT 
scores.”248 However, while it seems that collective bargaining 
agreements are related to differences between districts with respect 
to teacher quality, collective bargaining agreements do not 
exacerbate disparities in teacher quality within districts. In the same 
study, Professors Cohen-Vogel, Feng, and Osborne-Kampkin argued 
that more restrictive work rules, with respect to seniority rights and 
transfers, did not increase the existing teacher quality gap between 
high-minority and low-minority schools.249 These findings lend some 
support to prior arguments about the relationship between collective 
bargaining agreements and differences in teacher quality between
and within districts.250
There is also very little empirical research on the relationship 
between collective bargaining and student achievement. While 
research indicates a positive relationship between teacher salaries 
and collective bargaining, it is unclear how or if increases in salary 
translate into increased student achievement.251 In his review of 
research on the relationship between teachers’ unions and student 
achievement, Professor Goldhaber concluded that the results were 
247. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and 
Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, supra note 57,
at 89, 97.
248. Lora Cohen-Vogel, Li Feng & La’Tara Osborne-Lampkin, Seniority 
Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements and the “Teacher Quality Gap,” 35
EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 324, 334 (2013).
249. See id.
250. See William S. Koski & Eileen L. Horng, Facilitating the Teacher 
Quality Gap? Collective Bargaining Agreements, Teacher Hiring and Transfer 
Rules, and Teacher Assignment Among Schools in California, 2 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y
262, 297 (2007).
251. Dan Goldhaber, Are Teachers Unions Good for Students?, in 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, supra note 57, at 141, 148-49.
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mixed and that many of the studies faced significant methodological 
issues.252 Other studies have found negative relationships between 
collective bargaining and student achievement.253 Moreover, a study 
conducted by Professor Moe found that the effect of collective 
bargaining on student achievement is not consistent from district to 
district, but rather depends upon the district size and minority 
composition.254 In large districts, collective bargaining had a large 
negative impact on student achievement, especially for high-minority 
schools.
Finally, empirical research on the effects of interest-based 
bargaining in education is fairly limited, but there are several case 
studies of cities that have used interest-based bargaining. For 
example, Cincinnati implemented some aspects of interest-based 
bargaining during its 1988 contract negotiations, including monthly 
meetings to address contract-implementation issues and joint 
committees to address many aspects of schooling (e.g. curriculum, 
professional development, and allocation of federal funds).255
However, these efforts had mixed results and later negotiations 
assumed much of the negative tone and relationships of prior 
negotiations. Greece, New York also implemented interest-based 
bargaining in 1987.256 The Council for Change, a joint union–district 
committee, developed a reform agenda called The Renewal Plan,
which “called for greatly increased shared decision making by 
teachers at the building and district levels” and set the tone for future 
negotiations.257 The 1989 contract increased the flexibility of teacher 
work rules, created new roles for teacher–leaders, and encouraged 
school level shared decision making. 
Research on the effects of interest-based bargaining outside of 
education points to the benefits of this approach. Using survey data 
from many industries, Professors Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and 
Wells found evidence of a positive relationship between interest-
252. Id. at 157.
253. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers’ Unions Affect Education 
Production, 111 Q. J. ECON. 671, 712 (1996).
254. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the 
Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156, 172-73 (2009).
255. See Byron King, Cincinnati: Betting on an Unfinished Season, in A
UNION OF PROFESSIONALS, supra note 223, at 61, 68-69.
256. See Anthony M. Cresswell, Greece Central School District: Stepping 
Back from the Brink, in A UNION OF PROFESSIONALS, supra note 223, at 79, 85-86.
257. Id. at 84-85.
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based bargaining and certain contractual outcomes.258 In particular, 
negotiations that used an interest-based approach resulted in 
contracts that had greater flexibility in work rules and new pay 
arrangements, both outcomes that are often desired in teachers’ 
union negotiations. Another study of the effects of interest-based 
bargaining found that this approach to negotiation “[gave] rise to 
fewer union gains, more union concessions, and more mutual 
gains.”259 Additionally, unions make fewer gains in the areas of labor 
mobility and working hours when using interest-based bargaining. 
According to the same study, mutual gains occur far more frequently 
when interest-based bargaining is used, especially in the areas of 
grievances and disciplinary measures.260 So, interest-based 
bargaining may reduce the sheer number of gains made by teachers’ 
unions during negotiation but may be more likely to produce 
contracts that satisfy both parties and are seen as mutually beneficial.
IV. REINVIGORATING THE GOALS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A. Educational Goals and Policy Images of Teaching
Large-scale education reform in the period immediately 
following Brown and through the civil rights era was largely aimed 
at providing students with equal educational access to schools and 
learning opportunities. In doing so, such reforms were ultimately 
focused on maintaining an inclusive and robustly functioning 
democracy and facilitating social mobility. Other important goals for 
education reform, such as maintaining the international economic 
competitiveness of the U.S., have also emerged since the civil rights 
era. While these goals are also important to keep in mind when 
developing and implementing education reforms, it is critical that we 
do not forget the goals underlying the civil rights era reforms as well.
Given some of the primary education reform goals of the civil 
rights era, the current slate of reforms focused on teacher evaluation 
and collective bargaining has some promise. These reforms respond 
to major problems that other large-scale reforms have faced in the 
258. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Thomas Kochan & John Calhoun Wells, In 
Whose Interest? A First Look at National Survey Data on Interest-Based Bargaining 
in Labor Relations, 40 INDUS. REL. 1, 17 (2001).
259. Renaud Paquet, Isabelle Gaetan & Jean-Guy Bergeron, Does Interest-
Based Bargaining (IBB) Really Make a Difference in Collective Bargaining 
Outcomes?, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 281, 289 (2000).
260. Id. at 290.
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past. Perhaps most importantly, they focus on teachers, who are one 
of the most important influences in schools on students’ learning 
opportunities. Indeed, teacher quality and effectiveness are especially 
important for improving the learning opportunities of poor and 
minority students. However, these reforms are poorly designed on 
balance to provide all students with the learning opportunities they 
need to engage deeply with the democratic process and facilitate 
their social mobility in the twenty-first century. There are several 
problems in the design of current teacher evaluation and 
accountability systems that generally weaken their ability to improve 
teaching, such as widespread sources of invalidity. On a more 
fundamental level, the learning opportunities encouraged by laws 
governing collective bargaining and teacher evaluation laws are not 
well aligned with primary education goals underlying civil rights era 
education reform. Today, all students need to master not only 
specific content knowledge and skills in disciplines like mathematics 
and language arts; but they must also master broader competencies, 
such as knowledge creation, working with abstractions, thinking 
systemically, cognitive persistence, and collective cognitive 
responsibility.
Unfortunately, the legal environment structuring both of these 
reforms reflects a vision of teaching that is more closely aligned with 
industrial work than the sort of more “professional” work that is 
more attuned to such knowledge and skills. Indeed, the legal 
environment is rooted in certain “policy images” about teachers and 
teaching.261 Research on policy design reveals that the images 
policymakers hold about the target of a given policy, in this case 
teachers and teaching, influence the design of the policy and thus the 
implementation of the policy.262 While there are several possible 
policy images policymakers could hold about teachers and teaching, 
existing literature points to four primary conceptions about what 
good teaching is and how it can be improved.263
261. See Jonathan D. Jansen, Image-ining Teachers: Policy Images and 
Teacher Identity in South African Classrooms, 21 S. AFR. J. EDUC. 242, 242 (2001) 
(defining policy images as “preferred and cherished images about the [object] of an 
education policy”).
262. See Anne L. Schneider & Helen M. Ingram, Introduction: Public Policy 
and the Social Construction of Deservedness, in DESERVING AND ENTITLED: SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 5-8 (Anne L. Schneider & Helen M. Ingram 
eds., 2005).
263. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Arthur E. Wise & Sara R. Pease, Teacher 
Evaluation in the Organizational Context: A Review of the Literature, 53 REV.
EDUC. RES. 285, 290 (1983).
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First, the conception of teaching as labor envisions the work of
teaching as routinized and rationally planned.264 This definition 
conjures up a vision of factory work. Viewing the work of teaching 
as a type of labor minimizes the need for specialized knowledge on 
the part of the teacher. While a focus on the teacher’s work product, 
usually student test scores or identifiable classroom practices, 
implies that good teaching is a sufficient component of student 
performance, this focus also characterizes teaching as a set of 
procedures and protocols that leads to a predictable outcome.265 The 
conception of teaching as a craft goes beyond the conception of labor 
by acknowledging that teaching requires a set of specialized 
techniques.266
If the conception of teaching includes the exercise of judgment 
as well a set of specialized techniques, then it becomes the 
conception of teaching as a profession.267 Professors Achinstein and 
Ogawa define teaching professionals as those with “specialized 
expertise, who have discretion to employ repertoires of instructional 
strategies to meet the individual needs of diverse students, hold high 
expectations for themselves and students, foster learning 
communities among students, and participate in self-critical 
communities of practice.”268 The final conception of teaching is 
teaching as art. This conception builds upon the conception of 
teaching as a profession by incorporating personal insight, creativity, 
and improvisation into the use of judgment and specialized skills.269
Given the history of teacher evaluation, collective bargaining, 
and recent reforms, the legal environment is currently rooted in a 
strong policy image of teaching as labor. For these laws to encourage 
the sorts of learning opportunities needed for all students in the 
twenty-first century, this policy image must shift at least to 
profession. Providing all students with opportunities to learn 
competencies such as knowledge creation, working with 
264. Id. at 291.
265. See Samuel B. Bacharach, Sharon C. Conley & Joseph B. Shedd, 
Evaluating Teachers for Career Awards and Merit Pay, in THE NEW HANDBOOK OF 
TEACHER EVALUATION: ASSESSING ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL 
TEACHERS 133, 141-42 (Jason Millman & Linda Darling-Hammond eds., 1990).
266. Arthur E. Wise et al., Teacher Evaluation: A Study of Effective 
Practices, 86 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 60, 65 (1985).
267. See id.
268. Betty Achinstein & Rodney T. Ogawa, (In)Fidelity: What the 
Resistance of New Teachers Reveals About Professional Principles and Prescriptive 
Educational Policies, 76 HARV. EDUC. REV. 30, 32 (2006).
269. Darling-Hammond et al., supra note 263, at 65-66.
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abstractions, thinking systemically, cognitive persistence, and 
collective cognitive responsibility requires instructional skills, social 
skills, and judgment that go beyond those associated with labor and 
craft. So, the question now arises: How can teacher evaluation and 
collective bargaining be restructured to better fulfill the goals 
underlying the Civil Rights Act and civil rights era education
reforms in the twenty-first century?
B. Principles for Moving Forward
Recommendations to improve teacher evaluation and collective 
bargaining in line with the goals underlying civil rights era education 
reforms could take any number of forms. Here, we aim at laying out 
fundamental principles to guide such improvement. First, these 
reforms must grow from a vision of teaching and learning that is at 
least partly attuned to the goals of civil rights era education reforms 
while remaining relevant to the demands of the modern era. As 
discussed above, learning opportunities for all students should be 
focused not only on skills and knowledge in certain disciplines, but 
also certain broad competencies that go beyond those currently 
assessed under large-scale testing practices. The policy images of 
teachers and good teaching accordingly should be aligned to this 
vision as well.
In turn, the laws governing teacher evaluation and 
accountability should be restructured. On a surface level, issues such 
as the validity of testing practices should be resolved to the extent 
possible. More fundamentally, assessment practices should be better 
aligned to a robust policy image of teachers and teaching. Moreover, 
the construction of teacher evaluation and accountability systems
should be a more collaborative process that draws on input from the 
teacher workforce. As it currently stands, teacher evaluation and 
accountability systems are not well designed to motivate teachers. A 
more collaborative process would engender more “buy-in” from 
teachers, which is critical for ensuring that any reform aimed at 
improving teaching is effectively implemented.270 In addition, this 
process should be aimed not only at incentivizing teachers to work 
harder, but also developing teachers’ skills and knowledge. If 
teachers are to engage in a more “professional” form of teaching 
270. See Mueller & Hovde, supra note 198, at 24-25.
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more consistently, the legal environment should provide the 
necessary supports.271
Collective bargaining laws for teachers should be restructured 
around a similar set of principles. Although the actual research on 
the effects of collective bargaining is limited and mixed, the law in 
this area flows from a conception of teaching as industrial labor and 
typically treats bargaining as a zero-sum game between school 
districts and unions. Instead, the legal environment structuring 
collective bargaining for teachers should focus parties more on 
collaboration over issues that directly affect students. Indeed, as 
discussed above, teacher evaluation and accountability systems sit at 
the heart of the issues that should be bargained. By tilting bargaining 
away from such issues, the law fails to encourage the creation of 
robust learning opportunities for students.
Accordingly, state laws governing collective bargaining should 
encourage interest-based bargaining to a greater extent. Moreover, 
the law should encourage bargaining over issues that involve 
education policy to a greater extent. By bringing teachers’ unions 
into issues of education policy, the law would have a greater chance 
of supporting the development of high-performing schools that 
provide high-quality and equal learning opportunities for students. 
To be sure, such a shift in the nature of bargaining in education 
would require a massive reconstruction in many areas of the very 
idea of collective bargaining in education and appropriate union 
action. The politics characterizing the relationship between schools 
and unions is thick, and it is structured by the attitudes of several 
stakeholders, ranging from those in unions and schools to politicians 
and the general public. Restructuring bargaining in this fashion 
would be very difficult, especially given the current political climate. 
However, it would be a crucial step in shaping unions into more 
professional organizations that can consistently contribute to the 
improvement of student learning opportunities.
CONCLUSION
The fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act and sixtieth 
anniversary of Brown represent an important occasion to consider 
our current trajectory in education reform. By looking back to these 
271. See generally DAVID K. COHEN & HEATHER C. HILL, LEARNING POLICY:
WHEN STATE EDUCATION REFORM WORKS (2001) (discussing educational reform in 
California).
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landmark events, we can gain a vantage point to help us better 
understand the nature of current reform efforts. Teacher evaluation 
and accountability systems and states’ collective bargaining laws for 
teachers are two of the most important and widespread types of 
education reforms currently being undertaken. While these 
intertwined reforms have promise for improving and equalizing 
students’ learning opportunities, much work still needs to be done to 
help these reforms have significant and lasting effects at scale. By 
critically considering what types of teaching and learning are needed 
in the twenty-first century in light of goals underlying civil rights era 
education reform, we can begin to effect such changes and ultimately 
provide all students with the learning opportunities they deserve.
